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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the Kennedy Administration‘s decision to propose comprehensive civil
rights legislation in June, 1963. The work focuses on the relationship between the Kennedy
brothers, particularly on Robert F. Kennedy‘s position as his brother‘s main adviser and his
influence on the president‘s final decision to go forward with legislation. It begins by exploring
the Kennedy‘s childhood, then traces the brothers‘ approach toward civil rights during the
campaigns of 1952 and 1960, and concludes with an assessment of the Kennedy administration‘s
civil rights policy during his presidency. The thesis puts special emphasis on a May, 1963
meeting between Robert Kennedy and an eclectic bi-racial group of intellectuals led by the
novelist James Baldwin arguing that the meeting profoundly altered Kennedy‘s understanding of
civil rights, ultimately transforming the Kennedy legacy regarding civil rights.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 1963 Attorney General Robert Francis Kennedy and his assistant Burke
Marshall sat down in the Kennedy family‘s New York City apartment with novelist James
Baldwin and an eclectic group of white and black actors, playwrights, activists, and
professionals. Nearly two hours of heated discussion, accusations, and emotional outbursts
ended when Baldwin and his associates abruptedly walked out, ending a dialogue which on its
surface appeared to have accomplished little. Both sides, one representing the highest political
office in the land, the other representing the new face of activism, had failed to reach an
agreement on the direction that the movement needed to take. There was no indication that
either side fully understood the magnitude of what the other had been struggling to accomplish.
Baldwin‘s friends openly mocked the attorney general‘s assertion that the federal government
had been at the forefront of gradual change, while Kennedy scoffed at the group‘s suggestion
that the White House had no grasp of the reality and scope of the inequality that plagued
African-Americans on a daily basis.
The attack dogs and water hoses of Birmingham, the riots at the University of
Mississippi, and the violence directed towards the Freedom Riders had all passed, yet the federal
government had failed to produce direct initiatives and legislation that many black activists
hoped would spawn widespread social change. In the eyes of civil rights proponents, the
Kennedy administration had merely survived each of these crises, and their failure to follow suit
with comprehensive civil rights legislation demonstrated the White House‘s lukewarm
commitment to their cause. To these activists, the 1960 presidential campaign rhetoric
championing the need for executive moral leadership had lost its luster. The participants in the
1

Baldwin meeting came away feeling the same frustration that national civil rights leaders had felt
throughout JFK‘s presidency. Following the meeting, Baldwin maintained that a significant gulf
existed between the reality of the civil rights struggle and the administration‘s understanding of
that struggle.1 What the novelist did not realize at the time, however, was that something had
moved Robert Kennedy that day in New York. Fueled by resentment and frustration resulting
from the encounter, RFK set out to create substantive change. Soon after, he began restructuring
the Justice Department‘s hiring process. More important, he began urging his brother to adopt
effective civil rights legislation. Indeed, the Baldwin meeting profoundly influenced the path that
the attorney general would take in order to advance the cause of black equality.
For decades, historians have debated the Kennedy administration‘s handling of the civil
rights movement. Scholars have been particularly concerned with explaining why it took the
president three years to finally accept the necessity for comprehensive civil rights legislation. In
examining the Kennedys‘ approach to the civil rights movement, historian Bruce Miroff writes,
―[the movement] did not need guidance from Kennedy; it needed him, rather, to clarify and
interpret its efforts to those whose prejudice might be tempered or overcome by respect for the
nation‘s leaders. It needed him, in short, to bear witness to its fundamental righteousness.‖2 Yet,
Kennedy failed to provide that moral support until late in his presidency.
During the administration‘s first years, the Kennedy administration merely reacted to
situations created by civil rights activists, relying on executive orders and litigation to dispel civil
rights crises. In practice, the federal government was not a proactive force for civil rights. From
the 1961 Freedom Rides to the integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962, the
1

New York Times, 26 May, 1963, 1.
Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy (New York: David McKay
Company, 1976), 225.
2
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Kennedys consistently allowed the crisis of the moment to dictate their course of action. They
always advocated a minimalist position for federal intervention, only reluctantly taking action
when presented with no alternative avenue of mitigation. Yet by June 1963, the Kennedy
brothers had come to the realization that the civil rights movement was no longer confined to the
South, as it had found a voice in the poverty stricken northern urban ghettos. These people,
burdened by the effects of de facto segregation on housing and jobs were more than willing to
take up the cause for civil rights that their brethren in the South had begun. Circumstances
demanded an expedient response from the White House. Within months, the Kennedy
administration dramatically reversed their previous practice of responding to individual
situations to taking the lead in pressing for comprehensive, national civil rights legislation.
This thesis examines the transition in Kennedy administration thinking. Furthermore, it
argues that the meeting with Baldwin was the crucial turning point in that transition. To put this
argument in context, the first chapter traces the historiography of the Kennedy administration‘s
role in the civil rights movement. Although scholars have debated numerous reasons for
Kennedy‘s shift from complacency to action, none have given sufficient or proper attention to
the seemingly innocuous meeting between Robert Kennedy and the bi-racial group of
intellectuals.
The second chapter focuses on the relationship between Robert and John Kennedy. In
order to have a better understanding of the factors that helped the president conclude that the
time was right to create comprehensive civil rights legislation, one must understand the
importance and weight of Robert Kennedy‘s opinion articulated to his brother during moments
that required critical decisions. It was an influence and bond that had its origins in their
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childhood, and continued to evolve and solidify throughout their political careers. Its strength
came from their upbringing, with a foundation based in core family values, social status, religion,
and above all the expectations placed on them by their father. Chapter Three then explains how
that relationship was solidified during John‘s senatorial and presidential campaigns of the 1950s.
Chapter Four analyzes President Kennedy‘s civil rights policy during the first three years
of the presidency. This chapter places particular emphasis on the Kennedy‘s consistent lack of
executive initiation in favor of a policy of appeasement. The fifth chapter closely examines the
spread of the civil rights movement into the urban North, and how it helped to cultivate an
emerging radical critique of the systemic inequalities that faced blacks throughout the nation.
This chapter explains the growing importance of figures within the black community such as
James Baldwin, and what role they would have in re-energizing the movement. The final two
chapters discuss the Baldwin meeting, the personal impact it had upon on Robert Kennedy‘s
understanding and outlook towards the movement, and how it influenced JFK‘s decision to speak
to the nation on the need for civil rights legislation.
The Robert Kennedy who quietly urged his brother to go on television and make his
―moral crisis‖ speech on June 11, 1963 had a distinctly different ideological outlook toward
black civil rights from the attorney general who responded with anger at the relentless will of the
Freedom Riders two years earlier. This work demonstrates that much of that change can be
traced to the Baldwin meeting. Their discussion may have seemed ineffective on its face, but it
actually had a profound effect on Robert Kennedy, both politically and personally. That
transformation played a significant role in his recommendation that his brother take a legislative
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stand in support of civil rights, a decision that would permanently alter the Kennedy
administration‘s policies on racial inequality.

5

CHAPTER 1
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION

Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement
In his article ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights
Movement,‖ Steven Lawson notes that interest in the civil rights movement can be attributed to
―cycles of nostalgia that prompt Americans to recall the historical era of their youth. Memories
dredged up turbulent and unsettling times, yet they also harked back to inspirational moments
when ordinary people exhibited extraordinary courage.‖3
The historiography of the civil rights movement reflects similar cycles of nostalgia. Central to
those cycles is the tension between focus on particular individuals and specific events, as this
thesis does, and broader analyses relying on techniques of social history to interpret the
movement as a whole.
In the early 1970s Thomas R. Dye‘s Understanding Public Policy applied elite theory—
the idea that dominant minorities, drawn from the upper socioeconomic classes of the country,
exercise political hegemony over relatively powerless majorities— to the civil rights movement.4
Regarding civil rights policies, Dye postulates:
The politically active ruling minority is subject to relatively little direct influence from
the masses who are characterized as apathetic, passive and ill-informed. Elites use their
positions of influence to manipulate public opinion to advance their own interest. Thus
public policy generally reflects elite interests, not mass demands.5

3

Steven F. Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,‖ The
American Historical Review 96, 2 (1991), 457.
4
Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
5
Ibid., 46-47.
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Of Dye‘s many conclusions, perhaps the most relevant is his contention that elected white
officials only responded to black demands for equal opportunity when confronted with intense
protest campaigns that precipitated a growing political and social crisis that bordered upon
violence. Thus, by acquiescing to those demands, the political elites were able to preserve their
political system and their positions of power within it.6
Early histories of the civil rights movement echoed Dye‘s interest in elites, and set out to
explain how particular individuals or small groups in the black community created the crises that
pushed white elites into action. In the 1960s and 70s, historians tended to focus on major leaders
and figureheads of the national movement, such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. As Lawson points
out, these historians saw the struggle for civil rights as a political movement aimed at achieving
permanent legislative and judicial change.7 Authors such as August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, as
well as Helen Jacobstein concentrated on men who played various roles in the push for
legislative change to achieve black equality. 8
August Meier and Elliot Rudwick‘s CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement 19421968 examines the creation of Congress Of Racial Equality chapters in local towns and cities
that did not receive the same amount of national exposure as places like Montgomery. The
authors demonstrate how CORE‘s national leaders, such as James McCain and Gordon Carey,
influenced local leaders in their push for equal public accommodations. Lawson contends that
historical works of the 1970s were written to analyze how national civil rights organizations
6

Ibid., 77. Similar conclusions are reached in Cotman‘s test case of Dye‘s elite theory upon the Birmingham crisis
of the spring of 1963; John W Cotman, Birmingham, JFK, and the Civil Rights Act of 1963: Implications for Elite
Theory (New York: P. Lang, 1989).
7
Ibid., 456.
8
Helen L. Jacobstein, The Segregation Factor in The Florida Democratic Gubernatorial Primary of 1956
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972); August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil
Rights Movement 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Carl Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the
Second Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
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strived to achieve legislative victories, and Meier and Rudwick‘s book fits into that category.9
Although the book suggests that local organizations were critical to CORE‘s successes, it was
national leaders who drove the push for legislative change.
Helen L. Jacobstein‘s The Segregation Factor in the Florida Democratic Gubernatorial
Primary of 1956 illustrates how the racial climate within Florida was a major factor in
determining the election of the politically moderate LeRoy Collins as the Democratic candidate
for governor. The author discusses Collins‘s political strategy during his candidacy to solicit the
black vote in a state which was still hostile to desegregation of its public institutions. While
Jacobstein focuses on white politicians, she gives attention to the black community‘s significant
role in the political process. Written in 1972, this work manifests the growing importance of the
Black Consciousness Movement in Afro-American historiography. As Robert L. Harris explains,
such interpretations saw African American history as ―no longer an appendage to the main
currents of American History. It expressed a distinctiveness that would not be overwhelmed or
submerged to the American saga.‖10 Jacobstein‘s work reflects this idea of black distinctiveness,
in that she is able to present African-Americans as integral to changing American politics, even
in a system dominated by whites.
In the 1980s historians began to shift their focus away from national organizations toward
local community grass roots efforts. Drawing upon the methods of social history, historians
sought to explain how activists in smaller towns organized and fought for equality at the
community level. These historians suggested that the movement‘s importance lay not only in the
narrow goal of achieving legislative victory, but rather in the broader effort to create new social
9

Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 456.
Robert L. Harris, Jr. ―Coming of Age: The Transformation of Afro-American Historiography,‖ The Journal of
Negro History 67, no. 2 (1991), 109.
10
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identities for African-Americans.11 William H. Chafe‘s case study of Greensboro, North Carolina
Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom
illustrates this approach.12 Chafe traces the roots of protest in Greensboro back several
generations, showing how each subsequent generation had an effect on the following group of
protesters.
David Colburn‘s Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 18771980 takes a similar approach in examining race relations within a city over many decades,
illustrating how interactions between the black and white communities helped pave the way for
the demonstrations of the 1960s.13 Colburn examines the interaction between the white and black
communities of St. Augustine throughout the period of segregation. The author observes the
initial attempts to organize protest demonstrations by local African-American leaders that were
met with stiff resistance by the white community. Only when national figures, including Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr. and Fred Shuttlesworth, came to the city to give Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) support did protests seem to work. However, Colburn shows that
the momentum that had been gained by the mere presence of these men was almost immediately
lost when SCLC left the city to continue their work elsewhere. The author discusses how the
impetus of the floundering protest was placed back on the local activists to ensure its success.
Colburn‘s focus on the persistent drive by St. Augustine‘s local activists mirrors the transition in
focus that was being made within academic writings of the 1980s away from national figures and
organizations.
11

Ibid., 457.
William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom
(New York: Oxford Press, 1981).
13
David R. Colburn, Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-1980 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1985).
12
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Steve Lawson notes that community histories such as this are important in that they
reveal the conflict within and between black and white communities. He also suggests that they
demonstrate that ―blacks were not simply victims of separate but unequal policies; rather, they
retained a measure of social, economic, and political autonomy that under proper conditions
could fuel demands for equality and power.‖14 Colburn specifically focuses on the local level of
activism in order to illustrate not only the black community‘s desire for legislation that would
end segregation, but more importantly for their desire for social change that would redefine the
structure of race relations and racial equality within the city of St. Augustine.
Leedell W. Neyland‘s article, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott in Historical Perspective:
Changes and Trends,‖ illustrates a similar shift away from national objectives towards a
communal awareness at the grass roots level. Neyland examines how the leadership roles of local
ministers and businessmen in the Tallahassee movement played a vital function in establishing
an awareness of African-American solidarity. The author contends that the boycott‘s success
should not only be measured in the short term objectives of desegregation of the bus systems, but
in the ―lasting values found in the acquisition of new attitudes, the development of greater social
consciousness.‖15Other works on the boycott, such as Gregory Padgett‘s ―The Tallahassee Bus
Boycott,‖ describe how community leaders initiated and drove local protests. The boycott, he
argues, ―permanently transformed the social, political, and economical institutions of the city.‖16
Works such as Padgett and Neyland‘s demonstrate that civil rights activism in local cities and
14

Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 466.
Leedell W. Neyland, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott in Historical Perspective: Changes and Trends,‖ in The Civil
Rights Movement in Florida and the United States: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Charles U. Smith
(Tallahassee: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), 56.
16
Gregory B. Padgett, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott,‖ in Sunbelt Revolution: The Historical Progression of the
Civil Rights Struggle in the Gulf South, 1866-2000, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 2003), 190.
15
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towns did not consist of isolated events distinct to only one individual region. Instead, they
illustrate how local actions, even seemingly small-scale one, laid the foundation for the large
scale national movement that would emerge during the 1960s.
In the 1990s authors such as James M. Fendrich, Adam Fairclough, and James W. Button
continued to emphasize the role of local activist groups.17 Fendrich and Fairclough‘s works
examine student involvement in local movements. Button‘s study focuses on protest attempts in
smaller communities that did not receive national exposure. Fendrich‘s Ideal Citizens: The
Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement further explored the correlation between the Tallahassee
bus boycotts and the formation of student organizations and committees. The work is a social
history that places less emphasis on local leaders than on the ordinary citizens and students who
contributed to achieving legislative and social change. Similarly, Fairclough‘s article, ―The
Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, 1955-1959,‖ presents the impact of student sit-ins and demonstrations during the
late 1950s in communities throughout the South. Fairclough argues that the work of AfricanAmerican youths was critical in mobilizing the support of older generations of AfricanAmericans for organizations such as SCLC.
Button‘s Blacks and Social Change shows how small communities, such as those located
on the southeastern coastline, achieved desegregation of both public schools and
accommodations through local activism without the support of national civil rights organizations.

17

James M. Fendrich, Ideal Citizens: The legacy of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: State of New York
Press, 1993); Adam Fairclough, ―The Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1959‖ Journal of Southern History 53, no. 3 (1986); James W. Button,
Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989).
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Button argues that economic opportunity was a prime factor in mobilizing black protesters in
these communities. It was during this period of the late 1980s when scholarship began to connect
racial injustice and discrimination with poverty.18 Button claims that these communities were
unable to mount substantial protests or demonstrations until economic opportunities offered by
programs at Cape Canaveral brought an influx of African-Americans into the region, bolstering
support for local movements.
Even as scholars were working to connect local and national movements, other historians
sought to trace the civil rights movement‘s ideological foundations. Some looked to the
movement‘s deep roots, noting the ―legal, theological, and political legacies left by leaders and
organizations of the 1930s and 1940s.‖19 Works written during the latter half of the 1980s
reexamined the ideological roots of civil rights activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and
their impact on local activists and the legacy of the movement itself.20 David Garrow‘s Bearing
the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Leadership Conference examines the career
of Dr. King and his struggle to incorporate his faith and nonviolent ideology to a national
movement that was constantly evolving. In Bearing the Cross, activist Ella Baker recalls, ―The

18

Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 463.
Ibid., 457.
20
David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Leadership Conference (New York:
W Morrow, 1986); Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988); Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-1965 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1998); David Levering Lewis, King: A Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Stephen
Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Ben Green,
Before His Time: The Untold Story of Harry T. Moore, America’s First Civil Rights Martyr (New York: New York
Free Press, 1999); James C. Clark, ―Civil Rights Leader Harry T. Moore and the Ku Klux Klan in Florida,‖ The
Florida Historical Quarterly 73, no. 2 (1994); Jake C. Miller, ―Harry T. Moore‘s Campaign for Racial Equality,‖
Journal of Black Studies 31, no. 2 (2000); Caroline Emmons, ―Somebody Has Got To Do It: Harry T. Moore and the
Struggle for Africa-American Voting Rights in Florida,‖ Journal of Negro History 82, no. 2 (1997); Gary R.
Mormino, ―GI Joe Meets Jim Crow: Racial Violence and Reform in World War II Florida,‖ Florida Historical
Quarterly 73, no. 1 (1994); Steve F. Lawson, David R. Colburn, and Darryl Paulson. ―Groveland: Florida‘s Little
Scottsboro,‖ in The African American Heritage of Florida. ed. by David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995).
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movement made Martin rather than Martin making the movement.‖21 Works such as Garrow‘s
not only trace the ideological foundations of the modern civil rights struggle, but they also serve
to humanize leaders such as Dr. King as they attempted to continually adapt to the changing
goals and direction of the movement.
In recent years, scholars of civil rights history have begun to examine the external
influences on the struggle by non-governmental institutions. Likewise, they have looked at the
internal dynamics of local movements, including gender relations, within civil rights
organizations. Lawson suggests that community studies reveal the ordinary people that embody
the movement and lay at its foundations. Yet, a major problem evident in historical writings on
civil rights before the 1990s is that they tended to overlook gender differences in favor of
grouping both men and women together in racial solidarity.22 This approach emerged at a time
when historians such as Jacqueline Jones began challenging the traditional view of race and
gender. Jones puts forth the idea that scholars should not study the two as separate dichotomies,
rather that the focus should be on the point where race and gender intersect.23 In recent years,
literature published by authors such as Raymond Mohl and Glenda Rabby has challenged this
idea of racial solidarity and explored the intersection of gender and race.24 Through their studies
of the internal dynamics of gender within the movement, the authors have been able to examine
the roles of female participants at the focal points of local movements.

21

Garrow, Bearing The Cross, 625.
Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 467.
23
Jacqueline Jones, ―Race and Gender in Modern America,‖ Reviews in American History 26, no. 1 (1998).
24
Raymond Mohl, South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1960 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 2004); Glenda A. Rabby, The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in
Tallahassee, Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999).
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Raymond Mohl‘s South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement,
1945-1960, not only focuses on the role of Jewish people in the broader civil rights movement,
but also women‘s involvement in leading South Florida‘s local civil rights organizations. His
study of black and Jewish coalitions that fought for social equality examines a group of Jewish
women who faced intense hostility and discrimination both as a result of their gender and
religion, in addition to their alliance with African-American organizations. In a similar fashion,
Glenda A. Rabby‘s The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Tallahassee,
Florida examines the decade of activism following Tallahassee‘s bus boycotts. Rabby differs
from her predecessors by emphasizing the significant leadership roles played by both student and
women activists, such as the sisters Loretta and Lurlene Stephens.
The historiography of the civil rights movement has evolved over the last four decades.
The initial work of historians of the 1960s that analyzed the role of prominent individuals and
organizations in their efforts to achieve legislative change underwent a dramatic shift in the
1980s when the focus centered upon the study of grass root level activism. Recent works in
academia have enabled historians to continue their examination of community activism with a
more specialized look at both external and internal dynamics within these movements. The
historiography of civil rights activism can be defined by distinct shifts and categorized into
paradigms which have influenced historians since the 1960s, while contributing to a much larger
body of historical work that helps scholars to better comprehend the events and ideologies
behind the movement as a whole.
Yet despite the trend towards community based social history, the examination of
prominent elites and individuals and their influence on the movement continues to remain at the

14

forefront of civil rights studies. An inquiry into presidential politics and the civil rights
movement in the 1960s requires the engagement of the principles of Dye‘s elite theory as it
pertains to the political and ideological struggle between prominent civil rights leaders and the
executive branch. The study of the Kennedy administration and its approach to civil rights gives
the historian the opportunity to apply these principles in order to better gauge civil rights leaders
attempts to take an active role in shaping and defining executive policy and eliciting permanent
social change for African-Americans.

15

Historiography of the Kennedy Administration
Although there is a robust historiography devoted to John F. Kennedy‘s administration,
most work related to civil rights gives equal weight to both the president and his brother Robert.
As the point man for executing the White House‘s civil rights policy, Robert F. Kennedy carried
the president‘s complete confidence. Indeed, all major civil rights policy decisions were made
with the consent of both brothers. Thus, the historiography of civil rights in the Kennedy
administration is largely a historiography of the Kennedy brothers.
Historians have followed at least three major approaches in writing about the Kennedy
administration. The initial wave of scholarship, which occurred in the late 1960s and early
1970s, consisted of memoirs by various aides and acquaintances who knew the Kennedys on a
personal level. These works tended to offer favorable assessments of Kennedy and his policies,
often portraying a calm and collected oval office that exuded moralistic fortitude and vision.
With this type of work dominating the field, the next wave of historians began to produce
scholarship that provided a counter analysis of the Kennedy presidency. These tended to be
sharply critical of the president‘s policies and leadership. Several authors argued that instead of
calm fortitude, a distinct lack of leadership plagued Kennedy‘s administration, especially
evidenced in critical junctures. These scholars countered claims of moral leadership in civil
rights, maintaining that the White House in fact acted solely out of a fear that the issue would
threaten to undercut its own political agenda in such areas as foreign policy. These authors
argued that the Kennedys exploited civil rights activists in order to win the presidential election,
and once in power did little to support the movement. The third wave of scholarship attempted to
find a middle ground between these opposing interpretations. These works conceded that

16

Kennedy did not provide strong leadership for civil rights, but argued that he pursued a
pragmatic, rather than antagonistic, approach to the subject.
The first efforts to understand Kennedy‘s administration came from the president‘s
friends and advisers such as Theodore Sorensen, Harris Wofford, and Arthur Schlesinger.25 Their
books portray the Kennedy brothers as champions and staunch defenders of civil rights. These
authors argue that whereas their predecessors paid minimal attention to the civil rights struggle,
the Kennedys were constantly evolving and came to embody the moral compass that was
necessary for effective federal intervention. Unlike later historians, these authors describe the
Kennedy brothers as aware of the civil rights problem from the outset, asserting that this
awareness developed further as they attained more political power. Both Schlesinger and
Sorensen point out that although JFK was not an active defender of civil rights during his time in
Congress, he did vote in favor of every civil rights bill that came to the floor. Sorensen writes
that although he did so ―more as a matter of course than of deep concern,‖ the young Senator
was conscious of the inequality that existed, and that this understanding at such an early point in
his political career shaped his responses to crises he faced as president.26
These authors also endeavored to demonstrate a personal connection between the
Kennedy brothers and the movement. They argued that as members of a family of Irish
immigrants who faced discrimination in the early twentieth century, the Kennedys could
sympathize with the plight of African-Americans. Sorensen writes that the Kennedy brothers‘
speeches, ―invoked comparisons to the discrimination suffered by their Irish grandparents,‖
25
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although, he concedes, ―they did not really experience in their own lives the agony or prejudice
that Bob would later feel in the lives of others.‖27 Another example can be seen in the case of
the Coretta Scott King phone call. On the eve of the election, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was
incarcerated for demonstrations in Atlanta and was detained in a federal prison. Hearing of the
news, Kennedy aides suggested that the presidential candidate make a call as a gesture of good
will to Dr. King‘s pregnant wife. Schlesinger writes that one of the main factors in his making
the call was compassion. In their article, ―John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civil Rights,‖
Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger suggest that analyses such as those by
Schlesinger were done to create the perception that ―the call was symbolic of Kennedy‘s
empathy with the civil rights movement.‖28 These Kennedy apologists attempted to show that the
Kennedys‘ heritage and upbringing provided a moral commitment that was in place from the first
days of the presidency, and eventually led to the proposed legislation of 1963.
Early scholarship of the Kennedy administration expressed nearly unquestioning
approval of the administration‘s civil rights policies. Works by Henry Golden, Carl Brauer, and
R. E. Gilbert tended to associate Kennedy‘s accomplishments on issues pertaining to foreign and
domestic policy with those of civil rights.29 The most prominent, Brauer‘s John F. Kennedy and
the Second Reconstruction, focused on the impact that presidential politics had on the civil rights
movement at a national level. Brauer argues that the Kennedy administration‘s policies and
27
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tactical strategy to confront the issue of civil rights played a critical role in the legislative gains
made by African-Americans. He writes that Kennedy was the first president ―who genuinely
committed his administration to broad action taken specifically to improve the position of the
Negro.‖30 He also places the president at the forefront of the movement, as a figure whose
influence inspired realistic social change through executive action and moral rhetoric. Brauer
describes John Kennedy‘s inaugural address as representative of that leadership. ―The speech
moved a generation,‖ he writes, ―Years later it was still being cited by many who were young
when they heard it, as a turning point in their lives.‖31
Many of the early histories were defenses of the administration‘s record against critics
who had fervently voiced their objections to the lethargic pace of executive action. For example,
Schlesinger maintains that it took Kennedy almost three years to propose a comprehensive civil
rights bill not because the president and his advisers were oblivious to the outrage being
expressed by a large sector of the populace. Instead, Schlesinger claims, Kennedy acted out of
brilliant strategic political intuition that allowed for a civil rights plan that would garner
maximum results. Both JFK and RFK, he argues, recognized that at no time prior to the riots in
Birmingham was the political landscape prepared for such a bold initiative, and to propose such
legislation would have been a futile gesture that would accomplish little.32
The following decade saw a distinct analytical shift that presented a direct challenge to
the traditional views offered by the first generation of Kennedy historians. The authors called
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into question the myth of the president and his staff‘s interest and willingness to rectify the
problem of black equality. Works by Nick Bryant, Victor Navasky, Malcolm Smith and Henry
Fairlie portrayed the administration‘s response to civil rights crises as one of necessity and
reluctance, in which the federal government was forced into using their influence to maintain
peace.33 This shift coincided with the historiographical shift away from focus on political figures
toward civil rights organizations and leaders occurring within civil rights scholarship. These
authors point out that public expressions of concern for the civil rights movement were usually
empty rhetoric voiced primarily to give the administration maximum political leverage. Bryant
provides a damaging account of the John Kennedy‘s strategy of appealing to African-American
audiences in the weeks leading up to the Democratic National Convention while warmly
accepting segregationist governor John Patterson‘s endorsement. Bryant argues that this sort of
political maneuvering typified the Kennedy machinery, which attempted to gain the confidence
and support of both sides in order to ensure its own political success.34 Smith echoes this idea in
his work, John F. Kennedy’s 13 Great Mistakes in the White House, arguing that, ―By exploiting
a heart-rending problem for his political gain, and by failing then to honor the promise, the
President betrayed the Negroes.‖35
Fairlie and Navasky take similar critical approaches in their synopsis of the Kennedy
administration‘s civil rights record. The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation, Fairlie‘s
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scathing assessment, criticized not only the president and his advisers, but the institution which
allowed him to hold such a high office. He writes:
When the display of leadership is so convincing, and the reality of leadership is so slight,
the people will cease to understand the working of their political institutions. John
Kennedy proclaimed in measures and in messages that he wished to do so much; but he
in fact achieved so little. If a leader of such exceptional vigor, commanding an
administration of such unusual talents, could not achieve his purposes, there must be
something at fault with the political institutions which balked him…The poetic images of
dazzling popular leadership on which he relied were so dazzling that his neglect of the
solid world of things in which politics must make their useful adjustments was hardly
contemplated.36
Although Navasky‘s work was not so vitriolic, it nevertheless sought to expose the emptiness of
Kennedy‘s campaign rhetoric. Focusing on Robert Kennedy‘s Justice Department, Navasky
assails the attorney general‘s conservative approach to resolving civil rights crises rather than
initiating direct action. In Kennedy Justice, the author contends that Robert Kennedy‘s Justice
Department utilized a strategy in which ―confrontation was to be avoided and mediation rather
than coercion was the way to achieve social change. They thought they could reason and
negotiate with men like [segregationists] Ross Barnett and George Wallace.‖37
Much of the work that emerged in the mid 1980s sought to find a middle ground that
would neither praise nor vilify the Kennedys‘ civil rights record. According to Jackson and
Riddlesperger, these revisionists portrayed the administration as:
Pragmatists who adopted the civil rights movement as a matter of political expedience
and necessity…[W]hen JFK moved slowly on civil rights, it was because he feared that
pushing too hard might jeopardize other items on his agenda. When he pursued civil
rights actively, he used the highest moral rhetoric, but for political reasons more than a
moral commitment.38
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Authors such as Richard Reeves, Bruce Miroff, Taylor Branch, Irving Bernstein, and
James Hilty applied this idea of a pragmatic approach to their analyses.39 Although each author
varies in his praise and criticism for Kennedy‘s presidency, they all agree that the Kennedys
primarily comprehended issues in political terms. Miroff, for example, claims that the
administration simply approached every problem as a political situation to be rectified by means
of pragmatic liberal leadership. The racial crisis, therefore, was no different from the communist
threat; it was an issue to be confronted by merely ―placing emphasis upon tangible products.‖40
Kennedy, Miroff argues, did his best to eliminate his own personal interpretations, especially
because he had limited knowledge of the racial problems plaguing the country, by placing the
bulk of the responsibility on his subordinates, especially his brother, Robert.
Authors such as Miroff emphasize that neither JFK nor RFK had patience for moralistic
crusaders, nor did they have personal emotional investment in issues that would cause them to
alter their political philosophy. Richard Reeves, echoing this notion writes that Kennedy ―had no
particular feelings and great voids of knowledge about the day to day lives and cares and
prejudices of his fellow Americans…Kennedy usually knew what he had to know.‖41 The
revisionists see his presidency as defined by its ability to react, not anticipate. Jackson and
Riddlesperger write, ―When discrimination encroached on other policy areas, Kennedy wished to
avoid making civil rights a focal point at the expense of the higher priority…civil rights conflicts
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were to be avoided rather than confronted by the national government.‖42If a civil rights crisis
developed, then the Kennedys attempted mediation. Failing that, or if a particular crisis escalated
to the point of violence, then the administration reacted accordingly.
These historians do not miss Kennedy‘s attempts to exercise executive power as he
sought to push the movement into conventional political channels. Discussing the president‘s
handling of civil rights, Miroff observes, ―The issue was out of his control…Parallel to
Kennedy‘s public stance were his active efforts to gain control over it...he attempted to force that
struggle back into the traditional channels of American politics…each time in the long run he
failed.‖43Indeed, his and his brother‘s efforts were primarily aimed at maintaining the status quo.
At no time prior to 1963 did the Kennedys attempt to use the powers of the executive office to
anticipate and defuse a civil rights crisis before it had the chance to escalate. In his work on
Robert Kennedy, James Hilty surmises that the Kennedy brothers were benefactors of the social
changes that were happening around them. He writes:
In both life and death the Kennedys often got credit for more than they achieved. John
and Robert lived in changing times and stood at the epicenter of the tumultuous sixties,
but they were reactors to, rather than initiators of change. Splendid opportunists, they
carefully gauged events to leverage positions, maximize advantages, and minimize
weakness. Their principal objective was political power and prestige; their often soaring
eloquence raised expectations and promised greatness for their country and themselves.44

This study draws upon the diverse historiography of the Kennedy administration to
present a more complete view of the brothers‘ decision-making process. Rather than arguing that
they were always proactive, simply reactive, or merely pragmatic, this thesis argues that the
Kennedy‘s exemplified a complex, but very human, development in their thoughts and actions.
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The decision to push for comprehensive legislation provides convincing proof of that
development. Before we can arrive at that point, however, we must begin by examining the
relationship between the Kennedy brothers that developed from an early age to understand how
that bond would shape their approach to civil rights policy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EARLY YEARS: THE SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY

In order to comprehend the impact of decisions in matters concerning civil rights and the
relationship between the Kennedy brothers, one must begin by examining the varying paths that
brought them to the White House. Although both brothers would have some exposure to the
inequalities that existed between races, it was not until the presidential campaign of 1960 that
they would begin to realize the depth to which that division extended. The Kennedys initial
approach towards civil rights emerged as a result of political necessity, meant to attain victory in
the election, but never developed further, and as a result was incorporated into the civil rights
policy of the presidency. Facing a national campaign in 1960, the brothers recognized that unlike
previous senatorial campaigns, the regional divisions and attitudes towards race relations would
play a pivotal role in deciding the outcome of the election. The advent of widespread activism
promoting civil rights for African-Americans forced the Kennedy camp to adopt rhetoric that
would cater to both traditional segregationists and advocates of social change. This approach of
appeasement would set the standard for how the administration would attempt to resolve civil
rights issues in the years following the election. The problem the Kennedys faced in trying to
formulate and develop a strategy and political platform, was that they themselves had little
experience in dealing with the inequalities that resulted from segregation. Their youth had not
prepared them for the scope of the problem, nor did it provide any experience to fall back upon
during times of crisis. Thus, the pragmatic approach that they adopted reflected the views of
politicians who did not comprehend the depth of the problem, and who were unwilling to commit
themselves out of the fear of possible political repercussions.
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Bobby Finds His Place

The Kennedy boys, including older brother Joe Jr., John, and to a lesser extent Robert,
were groomed for politics from an early age. Their father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was intent on
utilizing his substantial wealth to gain political influence. Although he personally coveted the
presidency of the United States for himself, Joseph was stymied throughout the 1940s by
Democratic Party leaders, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, who hesitated to relinquish much
power to a man seen as power-hungry, ethically questionable, and who had seemed to
sympathize with the Nazis in the 1930s during his tenure as Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Having failed in his own political endeavors, Joseph steadfastly used his wealth and political
leverage to ensure that one of his own family members would eventually hold the office of the
president. Speaking to a group of friends about the futures of his sons, the Kennedy patriarch
admitted that he had decided that his aims could be best accomplished through his boys, and that
he had already begun developing plans to have Joe Jr. run for President of the United States,
John to become a president of a university, and Robert to become a lawyer.45 In order to ensure
these expectations were met, Joseph had his children attend the best private schools and
universities and set up trust funds worth millions of dollars in each of their names.
Growing up in the illustrious shadows of his older brothers, whose numerous
accomplishments between them included published books, war medals, and academic
achievement, RFK struggled to find a purpose and place within his large family. As the third
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Kennedy son, Robert consistently fought for the praise and recognition that Joseph lavished on
his two older brothers. He desired nothing more than to gain the attention and admiration of the
men of the family, and as a result he spent much of his early life emulating Joe Jr. and John.
When both of his brothers joined the military and won recognition for their service in World War
II, Robert begged his father to allow him to put off attending university in order to join the Navy.
Joseph, however, was adamant that his son would complete his education before entering the
service. Robert eventually acquiesced to his father‘s wishes and agreed to attend Harvard. While
there he began writing letters to his dad asking him to discuss political and social issues so that
he could at least share in a part of the father-son relationship that Joseph had with his two eldest
sons. In one of those letters he wrote, ―I wish dad that you would write me a letter as you used to
with Joe and Jack about what you think about the different political events and the war as I‘d like
to understand what‘s going on better than I do know.‖46 He was frustrated by his older brother‘s
vast knowledge and comprehension of world politics, and he wanted to attain a similar level of
understanding. His father, impressed by his son‘s willingness to learn, began a correspondence
with Robert, even offering words of advice and encouragement for the direction of his studies
and career.
Through this episode, RFK was already demonstrating two critical traits that would help
shape his work later in life. First was his unwavering loyalty and incessant need to find praise
and recognition from his father. He would later demonstrate this same attitude and approach
toward his brother, John. Reflecting on the strict Kennedy code of loyalty, family friend K.
Lemoyne Billings would comment, ―[Joseph Sr.] built within the family a real loyalty to each
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other…Mr. Kennedy always said that the family should stick together.‖47 As a result, Robert
began to mold his own outlook towards both his father and brother in order to comply with this
standard. Kennedy adviser Ed Guthman writes that as Robert was willing to revise his personal
identity in order to gain the praise of his father as a youth, so too would he incorporate a similar
revision to accommodate and adapt to his brother‘s expectations during his presidency.48 The
second trait that RFK showed was his willingness to listen and to educate himself on issues and
ideas that were unfamiliar to him.
The tough moralistic attitude that RFK would one day bring to the Justice Department
developed at an early age. During his first two years of high school his mother, a devout
Catholic, placed him in Portsmouth Priory, a private Catholic school run by Benedictine monks.
Robert thrived in this setting, attending morning and evening prayer and mass four times a week.
This was in sharp contrast to John‘s experience. Although his mother had enrolled John at
Canterbury, a Catholic school, the young Kennedy detested the school‘s strict discipline and
pleaded with his father to transfer him to the less stringent Choate Academy, a Protestant
preparatory school. Robert, however, blossomed both socially and spiritually in Catholic school.
He began to take an interest in sports and developed a strict personal moral code of conduct from
which he rarely strayed. He never drank or smoked, was openly dissatisfied with his sibling‘s
lewd romantic affairs, and refused to listen to or laugh at his peers‘ crude jokes. Journalist Jack
Newfield would later reflect, ―[Robert‘s] central values were toughness and morality,
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determination and discipline.‖49 From an early age Robert saw the world in moralistic terms,
showing disdain for those he perceived as excessive and decadent.
Joe Jr.‘s death in combat forced both Robert and John to reexamine their roles within the
family. The loss of his first born crushed their father, who withdrew emotionally from the family
for a time. John was conscious of the fact that his father‘s lofty expectations and plans for Joe Jr.
were to be placed on his shoulders. RFK, whose parents saw him as their most fragile son, dealt
with the tragedy by exuding the toughness that had been preached to all of the Kennedy children
since birth. He isolated himself and turned to his faith. He went through a period of
introspection in which he questioned whether or not his father shared the same level of emotional
attachment to him as he did with Joe Jr. and John.50
During this time of self evaluation, Robert decided that his new role within the family
was that of mediator and protector. Unlike Joe Jr., John was a free spirit willing to openly
challenge his father‘s will whenever he felt overburdened by his expectations. Joseph Sr., used to
directing his sons, resented these challenges. As he would later do during his brother‘s
campaigns, Robert acted as a buffer between the two, always ready to appease and placate a
heated situation. A guest of the family in Hyannis Port recounted that shortly after Joe Jr.‘s
death, John brought some friends from his PT boat to the house for dinner. Joseph had a strict
house rule that family and guests were allowed only one drink before dinner, but John and his
friends were repeatedly sneaking alcohol out of the kitchen. RFK was aware that his father was
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still emotionally distraught over the loss of his son, and desperate to avoid conflict, ran straight
to John and began openly chastising and berating the entire group for their behavior.51
Arthur Schlesinger suggests that this time period was critical to the transformation of
Robert‘s character. He writes, ―The code of Kennedys discouraged undue emotion…Robert was
in effect remaking his personality…in his determination to overcome doubts of his own worth
and to win the love of the most important person in his life.‖52 Robert‘s biographer James Hilty
writes that his ―personality and behavior were shaped by his abiding sense of moral certainty, by
his attempt to gain his father‘s approval, and by his struggle to accomplish something as
significant as his brother‘s colorful achievements. His earnest nature made him feel like an
outsider.‖53 Robert described himself in the harshest of terms, emphasizing that his poor
academic record and inability to gain his father‘s favor symbolized that he had little status within
the family. Even his own siblings viewed him as a failure. When asked about her younger
brother, Eunice Kennedy told an interviewer, ―Bobby? Forget it. Let‘s talk about the other
boys.‖54
Robert Kennedy‘s role as protector and mediator fulfilled his desperate search for a place
within his family. He was willing to invest everything he had to support his family and further its
goals—a trait that would be essential to his future political career with his brother. Evan Thomas
writes that this role as protector allowed him to attain a unique position within his family,
―though at a cost: his independence of spirit would be sublimated, his more sensitive and
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winning qualities covered over in a hard defensive shell.‖55 Furthermore, this new role helped lay
the foundation for the bond with John that had been lacking throughout their childhood.
Following his graduation from law school and at the request of his father, Robert became
the campaign manager for John‘s 1952 senatorial campaign. Joseph, obsessed with fulfilling his
dream of having one of his sons attain political power in Washington, continuously attempted to
dictate the campaign‘s direction. His efforts only served to frustrate and strain the relationship
with his son. RFK‘s arrival as manager diffused the familial tension while allowing both brothers
to break free from their father‘s will and set their own political course.56 Exercising his new
found assertiveness, Robert took the majority of the responsibility for running the campaign
away from Joseph, forcing the Kennedy patriarch into an unaccustomed, more subdued, role.57
Robert‘s new position also gave him his first unvarnished exposure to the machinery of
American politics. The onus fell on him as manager to deal with critics of the candidate, favorseekers, and freeloaders who were attempting to boost their own political careers on his brother‘s
coattails. He ran interference to ensure that John‘s reputation and message were not sullied or
lost in campaign politics. During a meeting at campaign headquarters, Robert told staffers, ―I
don‘t want my brother to get mixed up with politicians...I don‘t care if anyone around here likes
55
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me, as long as they like Jack.‖58 The experience served him well, developing the hard-nosed, nononsense approach that would be invaluable to him later in his career.
On a personal level, Robert became even more protective of his brother because he saw
firsthand how sick John was. In 1947 the elder Kennedy brother was diagnosed with Addison‘s
disease, an illness caused by the failure of the adrenal glands which leads to circulatory collapse
and weakness. RFK had become aware of the seriousness of his brother‘s illness the previous
year when their father had sent his sons on a tour of the Far East. While in Okinawa, John was
rushed to the hospital with a temperature of 106 degrees. A petrified Robert sat at his brother‘s
bedside and watched as a priest administered the last rites.59 Biographer Evan Thomas writes
that, ―In the 1952 Senate race, Kennedy‘s health was his greatest campaign vulnerability. Had
voters known how truly sick the handsome war hero was, his political career could have been a
nonstarter.‖60 Both Robert Kennedy and his father understood that John‘s illness could cripple
the campaign, and resolutely worked to hide the disease‘s physical effects from the public. They
kept the crutches John needed the majority of the time out of sight from media gatherings, and
they had him sit under a sun lamp in order to give him a false tan. Joseph ensured that cortisone
shots, which at the time were seen as an effective treatment for the disease, were on hand at all
times.
Devout loyalty overcame major personality differences between the brothers. As personal
friend and adviser to both Kennedys, Ed Guthman recalled the brothers as being complete
opposites in terms of their characteristics and mannerisms. He writes, ―John was urbane,
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objective, controlled, a man of reason; Robert was brusque, subjective, intense, a man of
emotion.‖61 John assessed most situations in a calm collected manner, analyzing issues from
various political perspectives, whereas Robert tended to react with emotion and impatience.
These differences allowed the brothers to develop an understanding and trust in all matters,
personally and politically. Despite contrasting personalities, Robert F. Kennedy would serve as
John‘s closest adviser and contribute to the majority of crucial decisions that would be made
during the campaign and later during the presidency. Kennedy adviser Kenneth O‘Donnell
described RFK as being the essential balance that allowed the president to make critical
decisions at times when no other voice within the administration was willing to take a definitive
stand on an issue. He writes, ―The best description of Bobby Kennedy is one that says at
most…times, especially when his older brother was depending on his firm support, he was wise,
calm, restrained, full of courage and understanding, and very realistic in getting to the hard facts
of the situation.‖62 John was conscious of the balance that his relationship with his brother
provided. Shortly after his election to the presidency, he approached Robert and asked him to
become his attorney general. He said to him, ―I need to know that when problems arise I‘m
going to have somebody who‘s going to tell me the unvarnished truth, no matter what…I want
somebody who is going to be strong…and I need you in this government.‖63 JFK knew that he
could turn to his brother when he needed to hear a blunt and realistic assessment of an issue.
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―John really wanted Bobby by his side, helping him to make the decisions on everything.‖
explained author Jeff Shesol, ―Because there was only one person in the world that John
Kennedy trusted unequivocally, and that was Robert.‖64 It was a relationship that would prove
crucial to the stability of the administration. Commenting on the bond that existed between the
Kennedy brothers, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would say, ―Don't kid anybody about who
is the top adviser, Bobby is first in and last out…Bobby is the boy he listens to."65
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The Kennedys and African-Americans

Growing up in Massachusetts, neither Robert nor John Kennedy were confronted or
exposed to the inequality that existed between races. Upon reflection, RFK said, ―I don‘t think it
was a matter that we were extra concerned about growing up…we grew up with the idea that
there were a lot of people who were less fortunate…separating the Negroes as having a more
difficult time, that was not a particular issue.‖66 The reality of their situation was that relatively
few numbers of blacks lived in their home state at the time, and even fewer had the opportunity
to interact with the brothers.
The Kennedy‘s social status and wealth afforded them few chances to develop any sort of
lasting friendships or relationships with African-Americans. With the exception of an
acquaintance with his personal valet, George Taylor, at no point during his schoolboy years at
Choate and Harvard did John have any significant interaction with blacks. While at a campaign
stop during the 1960 presidential race, JFK was asked by a black dentist in San Francisco how
many black people he was friends with. Embarrassed, Kennedy replied, ―Doctor, I don‘t know
five Negroes of your caliber well enough to call them by their first names, but I promise to do
better.‖67 Ted Sorensen notes that before the election of 1960, ―[Kennedy] simply did not give
much thought to civil rights…and had no background or association of activity.‖68 Until his
career as a politician began in the late 1940s, the treatment of blacks and the inequalities of the
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system of segregation lay on the periphery of John F. Kennedy‘s social stratosphere, he was
simply never exposed nor placed in a position that would allow him to bear witness to racial
injustice.
In a similar fashion, Robert‘s childhood was exempt from exposure to black inequality.
Although he would later claim that several of his best friends during his childhood were AfricanAmerican, it was not until his years in university that he would be directly confronted with racial
discrimination.69 One episode in particular took place during his final year at the University of
Virginia Law School. As head of the Student Legal Forums, it was RFK‘s responsibility to
schedule guest speakers. He used his father‘s connections to invite illustrious speakers to come
to Charlottesville, including Joseph McCarthy, Arthur Krock, John F. Kennedy and even Joseph
himself, who delivered a controversial speech on the failures of the Truman Doctrine. In the
spring of 1951, Robert invited Dr. Ralph Bunche, the under-secretary to the United Nations and a
Nobel Prize winner for Peace, to come to the campus and address the law students at UVA.
Bunche, an African-American, told Robert that he would gladly accept the invitation, however
he stipulated that under no circumstance would he give his speech to a segregated audience.
Kennedy petitioned the student council for a resolution that would allow the audience to be
integrated. The council rejected the resolution, claiming that it would violate a Virginia law
which banned such meetings. Infuriated by the decision, RFK called the councils decision
―morally indefensible‖, claiming that the council themselves were ―gutless.‖ Taking the initiative
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he pleaded his case to the university president, and with his backing along with the dean of the
law school and several professors, Bunche was granted permission to address an integrated
audience, the first of its kind in the history of the school.70 At this point in his life, the question
of social equality for Robert Kennedy was simply one that was approached in terms of moralistic
principles, no different from any other injustice that he witnessed.71 There was no great
examination of black civil rights, nor was there any particular effort on his part to involve
himself in an exploration of the issues that surrounded racial inequality. Civil rights activist
Roger Wilkins would later say of the Kennedy brothers, ―They didn‘t know black people. They
didn‘t know black pain. They were not comfortable with black people…So, there was no reason
to expect them to be wise or passionate about it.‖72

****
The years between 1950 and 1952 helped to define Robert‘s role as protector for his
brother, both politically and personally. His active role as campaign manager helped prove his
worth to his father, his brother and himself. It was a pivotal period that through his loyalty and
relentless fortitude, helped gain a level of respect and trust from Joseph and John that would
prove invaluable during the bid for the White House eight years later. The contrasting
personalities of the brothers played a crucial factor in the political success that would ensue
following the senatorial victory of 1952. Yet, it was RFK‘s transformation that allowed the
relationship to find a complimentary balance. Hilty writes that although Robert was seen by most
70
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as ruthless, he had in fact evolved the exact kind of personality that could keep John‘s sardonic
approach in check. He notes that Robert ―could be vexedly absurd yet coldly deliberate, wildly
irrational yet profoundly logical, extremes that the public nature of his political education only
magnified.‖73 Upon reflection, Joseph Kennedy felt that the political success of the 1952
campaign was to be attributed to the very different men that his sons had become. He described
the evolution of Robert‘s personality when he said, ―Bobby feels more strongly for and against
people than Jack—just as I do…He hates the same way I do…he has the capacity to be
emotionally involved, to feel things deeply, as compared with Jack and that amazing detachment
of his.‖74
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CHAPTER 3
THE CAMPAIGN: PROMISES OF A BETTER FUTURE

The presidential election of 1960 was one of the closest in the history of the United
States, with John F. Kennedy winning the national popular vote over Republican candidate
Richard M. Nixon by a mere 118,574 votes.75 The fiercely contested campaign pitted two very
different candidates against a backdrop of a racially segregated society on the brink of social and
cultural change. At the outset of the campaign, both Kennedy and Nixon recognized that the
election would most likely be decided in critical states, such as Illinois and New York, which had
the largest amounts of electoral votes.76 While Kennedy focused his efforts on gaining the
suburban and Protestant vote, Nixon was more concerned in winning the farm and Catholic
vote.77 The voting public‘s perception at the time was that the previous presidency of Republican
Dwight D. Eisenhower had been defined by general inaction in both domestic and foreign
policy.78 Thus, two of the main issues facing the candidates centered on the state of the economy
and foreign relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of anti-communist sentiment of the
1950s. However, two other issues that would play a prominent role in the campaigns for both
candidates, as well as the final election tally, involved the religious affiliation of JFK and the
struggle for African-American civil rights.
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The economy under President Eisenhower had seen steady and modest annual growth,
yet it also had to endure three recessions and a growing division between the upper and lower
classes. Historian Robert Fried describes this time period as one of ―rampant consumerism‖ that
resulted in ―pockets of poverty throughout the public sector.‖79 Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger
mirrored this point in a memorandum to JFK, in which he stated the need to address the
existence of ―public poverty in the midst of private plenty.‖80 Soviet relations also played an
important role in the campaign, with the Kennedy camp charging that the lackluster gains in
foreign relations by the previous administration had resulted in the existence of a ―missile gap‖
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in
1957 did little to quail JFK‘s criticism of Eisenhower and his failure in allowing the communist
nation to gain an advantage in the technology race that many perceived as a threat to U.S.
domestic security.81
From the outset of the campaign, John F. Kennedy‘s religion was the subject of
widespread debate. Never in the history of the presidency had a Catholic been elected, and many
critics openly questioned whether a Roman Catholic president would be able to properly separate
church and state.82 Although anti-Catholic sentiment would eventually cost JFK numerous voting
districts on the day of the election, it would also serve as a tool to garner votes as well, as the
Kennedy‘s were able to paint those who based their opposition towards the candidate on religion
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alone as acting out of bigotry and ignorance.83 The Catholic issue would remain an important
topic throughout the course of the campaign, one that Kennedy would repeatedly address in an
effort to distinguish himself as a candidate who would place the priorities and security of the
country first and foremost.84
The issue that the Kennedy camp was most uncomfortable and ill prepared to confront,
however, was that of black civil rights. Prior to 1960, no presidential campaign had addressed
civil rights as a major issue, therefore the Kennedys had no precedent to follow, and as a result
they chose to incorporate a strategy that consisted of a policy of appeasement to both proponents
of black equality and segregationists. Both Robert and John were aware of the impact of the
African-American community on the outcome of the election, both in actual votes as well as the
perception of the segregationist South. If they were to appear soft on segregation, they risked
losing the southern vote, however if they appeared in favor of it they risked alienating an entire
voting bloc of African-Americans. It was an uneven balance that they sought to maintain
throughout the primaries and the general election. Yet the promises of the campaign, and the
events involving the King phone calls in the days leading up to the general election helped to
create a level of expectation for progress in civil rights that would burden the Kennedy
presidency, and set a precedent for which the administration was not prepared to champion.

83

Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1978), 226. Nixon
writes, ―At every possible juncture and on every possible occasion Kennedy‘s associates were pushing the religious
issue, seeing to it that it stayed squarely in the center of the campaign, and even accusing me of deliberate religious
bigotry.‖
84
John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers. Box 1049. September 12, 1960. Speech to the Ministerial Association.
Houston, Texas.

41

Waning Support in the Black Community

The issue of civil rights was unfamiliar territory for Robert Kennedy, and as campaign
manager it was his job to help create an encompassing platform for his brother to run on that
would include some sort of statement on the issue. Throughout the 1952 campaign, the subject of
black inequality had not been a major factor in John Kennedy‘s election to the Senate. However,
facing the possibility of a national election, the focus on the future of civil rights was becoming
more prevalent. Preparing for the campaign, Robert admitted that he approached civil rights in a
similar way to that of his predecessors. He commented:
Those running for office [in the 1950s] for the Democratic Party looked to just three or
four people who would deliver the Negro vote. And you never had to say you were going
to do anything on civil rights…it was mostly just recognition of them…you could receive
the vote quite easily.85
This process of appeasement and recognition was, in Kennedy‘s estimation, the ideal formula to
win the black delegates vote for the Democratic nomination, and then the black voting districts in
the general election. What this strategy in fact demonstrated, however, was his lack of
understanding on the issue and the growing complexity of the movement. At its outset, the
campaign began with the idea that it would handle the civil rights issue by running on JFK‘s
voting record in Congress coupled with favorable, albeit cautious, rhetoric that would appeal to
black voters.86 They hoped that by doings so, they would be able to circumvent any direct
conflicts from segregationists and civil rights proponents alike.
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Although the Kennedys had not initially anticipated the black vote to play a major role in
the election, criticism directed at JFK from major civil rights leaders and activists forced the
campaign to strengthen their platform. Unimpressed by John‘s senatorial record, black journalist
Chuck Stone wrote:
Kennedy has the ability to talk out of both sides of the face simultaneously…There‘s one
thing money can‘t buy. That is a liberal and forthright attitude toward Negroes and their
fight for equality. Senator Kennedy does not have this attitude. Senator Kennedy has
been equivocating on civil rights so long, he wouldn‘t know a forthright statement on
racial equality if it were dragged across his breakfast table. Search his Senate speeches.
Has he ever condemned the South‘s barbaric attitude? Has he ever shown deep concern
about the second-class citizenship? In the present spectrum…Senator Kennedy is
unquestionably the worst of the lot for the American Negro.87
The problem with relying on Kennedy‘s voting record in the Senate to appease potential black
voters, was that his support towards civil rights had fluctuated based on the circumstances
surrounding each individual vote. This pattern of voting caused many civil rights activists to
claim that his support was merely one of convenience.
Although JFK had voted favorably for minor civil rights legislation during the first five
years of his term in the Senate, his reputation came into question during the congressional debate
of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. These debates cost Kennedy a great deal of black support, as
activists aggressively criticized his decision to vote with southern senators in favor of a jury trial
amendment. Civil Rights leaders vehemently opposed the amendment, claiming that it would
enable southern juries to be packed with racists, thus preventing blacks their entitlement to a fair
trial. In his explanation of why he voted for the amendment, JFK admitted that he had examined
the issue solely in legal terms. He had met with Ivy League law professors, who had assured him
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that the amendment would have no legal ramifications on civil rights.88 Dismissing this
explanation, civil rights and northern activists saw Kennedy as simply playing politics and
ignoring the moralistic consequences of his vote. The passage of the jury trial amendment
ensured that southern senators would vote in favor of the Civil Rights Act. Consequently as a
result of the amendment, the Act as a whole was severely limited in its real world application.
New York Times columnist James Reston openly questioned Kennedy‘s unabashed attempt to
gain southern allies, when he wrote that the Senator was aware that the South ―would not take
kindly to any Presidential candidate who insisted on rejecting the jury trial principle.‖89 His
detractors believed that Kennedy‘s voting record and active interest in playing both sides of the
civil rights issue was based on his intent to gather support from both Democrats and Republicans
in order to make a bid for the presidency. Historian Nick Bryant writes that Kennedy emerged
from the 1957 debate ―looking opportunistic and unprincipled…he underestimated the growing
militancy of black allies…who viewed any form of compromise as a breach of faith.‖90 These
criticisms would linger throughout the initial stages of JFK‘s presidential campaign, and would
eventually force him to take a more active role in the debate over black equality.
A Shift in Strategy

Once the campaign had begun, Robert Kennedy stepped in to his familiar role as
campaign manager and immediately confronted the critics who had set out to discredit his
brother. RFK understood that his preliminary campaign strategy would not withstand the barrage
of attacks on John‘s civil rights voting record. One of the most biting attacks that forced the
88
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campaign to take a firmer, more deliberate tone in favor of racial equality resulted from an
editorial by Jackie Robinson in the New York Post. Robinson, a well respected civil rights
pioneer and hero in the eyes of the black community, launched a scathing attack on JFK‘s
presidential qualifications. He openly criticized the Senator‘s guarded token position on the sit-in
movement, his association with segregationist governor John Patterson, his role in the 1957 civil
rights debate, as well as his lack of African-American audiences on the campaign trail. Robinson
concluded the editorial bluntly stating, ―Senator Kennedy is not fit to be President of the United
States.‖91 This damaging diatribe from one of the most influential black leaders of the day was a
clear signal that the campaign needed to adopt a stronger, more comprehensive civil rights
platform.
Following this editorial, JFK began a series of speeches that attempted to demonstrate the
need for strong executive leadership on civil rights in the White House.92 His first speech in
support of this leadership came the day after Robinson‘s editorial was printed. At a dinner in
Minneapolis, Kennedy came out in support of meaningful executive action. He told those in
attendance that the time had come for the Democratic Party to come out definitively in favor of
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black Americans. He promised that if elected, he would bring about strong moral leadership and
would ―fight until every black citizen has achieved equal access to all of American life.‖93
Despite this shift in rhetoric, the Kennedy camp still lacked the overwhelming support it
needed to win the nomination. On the eve of the Democratic Convention, RFK met with Harris
Wofford and asked the civil rights activist to join the campaign as an adviser on race relations,
making him the point man for developing the new platform. What worried Robert the most going
into the convention was the lack of strong support from blacks within the Democratic Party. He
later said, ―We had to make more of an effort because Negroes were not tied to John F. Kennedy
as they would be ordinarily to a Democratic leaders.‖94 In his memoirs, Wofford recalls Kennedy
bluntly telling him, ―We‘re in trouble with Negroes. We really don‘t know much about this
whole thing. We‘ve been dealing outside the field of the main Negro leadership and we have to
start from scratch.‖95 The recruitment of Wofford paid immediate dividends, as he was able to
draw up a memorandum that spelled out the specific areas in which JFK could make ground
towards gaining the vote of black Democrats. In this brief, Wofford declared that Kennedy must
be able to provide direct and active leadership that would be both substantive and symbolic. He
wrote, ―The president must by his own example—by meeting with Negro and white leaders, by
the appointment of qualified Negroes to high office, and by more dramatic symbolic actions in
moments of racial crisis—convey this sense of urgency and conviction.‖96 Most importantly
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though, was a series of meetings that Wofford set up between John and black delegates to the
Democratic Convention. These meetings allowed Kennedy to better gauge the issues seen as
most pertinent in the struggle for equal rights, and thus he was able to incorporate those ideas
into his civil rights plank for the convention.97
Whether or not JFK truly believed the proposals he was putting forth in his campaign
speech, the fact was that this approach helped rebuild many of the relationships and ties with
black leaders that had been fractured as a result of the events of 1957. Robert Kennedy was
willing to admit that at this point in the political process both he and his brother lacked a solid
understanding of racial inequality. This hindered their ability to create a definitive strategy that
would help bolster black support for the Kennedy campaign and win the nomination. By
bringing Wofford into the fold, they were able to subtly exploit and play to the passions of civil
rights advocates in order to attain political victory.98
John F. Kennedy had raised the stakes of the election through his heightened rhetoric, and
in doing so had brought the issue of civil rights to the forefront of presidential politics and placed
himself in the position of being viewed by many political pundits and the populace alike as the
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new moral compass for the country. Wofford‘s strategy paid off, helping to garner enough votes
to earn JFK the Democratic presidential nomination. Yet at the same time, that same strategy
inadvertently elevated the level of expectations for strong executive moral leadership in favor of
civil rights to heights that no president had dared to attempt. These expectations far surpassed
any that the Kennedys would be prepared to deal with upon entering office the following year.
The King Calls

The courtship of the black vote would prove to be one of the defining points in
determining the election of 1960, as both candidates were forced to tread lightly when dealing
with a society that was racially segregated. Yet, the entire process of campaigning also
demonstrated how little the Kennedys comprehended the magnitude of the race issue. To them,
the black vote simply represented a political bloc that was necessary to achieve victory. During
the election year, the South was still strongly Democratic, and the brothers had to find a delicate
balance which would enable John to garner both the black and white vote without offending the
opposing sides. On one hand, Kennedy was pressured by prominent liberals such as Henry Steele
Commager, John Kenneth Galbraith, and James M. Burns to make a strong commitment to civil
rights. On the other side, several southern Democratic governors threatened to back Nixon if
Kennedy was to publicly show support to civil rights figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.99
To ease the demands of civil rights proponents, John offered campaign promises such as
the elimination of federal housing projects, and continued to increase his civil rights rhetoric
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following the Democratic Convention.100 When discussing the civil rights movement, JFK had
boldly proclaimed, ―[the next president] must exert the great moral and educational force of his
office to help bring equal access to public facilities from churches to lunch counters and to
support the right of every American to stand up for his rights, even if on occasion he must sit
down for them.‖101 However, in an effort to maintain the balance of the segregated South,
Kennedy also continued to court the vote of white segregationists. In a move that shocked and
perplexed many civil rights supporters, he selected Texan Lyndon B. Johnson as his vicepresidential running mate.102 Segregationist leaders interpreted this move as an indication that
the Kennedy presidency would be more apt to incorporate civil rights into the national agenda at
a slower pace than their campaign rhetoric had suggested.
As a result of Kennedy‘s attempts to secure support from both sides of the racial
spectrum, neither presidential candidate had the overwhelming support of the black vote by midOctober of the election year. In his memoirs, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. commented, ―I did not
feel at that time that there was much difference between Kennedy and Nixon…I could find
something in the background of both men that I couldn‘t particularly agree with.‖103 After
months of campaigning, however, the decisive moment that would help to define each candidate
in the eyes of many voters would take place in the final weeks before the election. The catalyst
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that helped one candidate emerge as the victor stemmed from the controversial events
surrounding the arrest of Dr. King in Atlanta, Georgia. The phone calls made in response to
King‘s incarceration by both JFK and RFK helped to separate the two candidates in the eyes of
minority black voters, and thus altered the course of the election.
On the morning of October 19, 1960 Dr. King reluctantly joined a massive sit in
demonstration in downtown Atlanta, and was subsequently arrested along with the student
demonstrators. Wofford, without authority from the Kennedy camp, brokered a deal with the
presiding judge that would allow the demonstrators to be released on Monday, October 24. King,
however, was denied his release on the grounds of a violation of the terms of a suspended
sentence resulting from a minor traffic offense in which he had been cited for driving without a
Georgia driver‘s license the previous spring. A judge in DeKalb County, Georgia issued a
warrant for King‘s arrest on the basis that his sit-in arrest had violated the terms of his probation
from the traffic offense.104 King was transferred to a prison in DeKalb, a stronghold of the Ku
Klux Klan, where he was sentenced by the judge to four months of hard labor. Upon hearing the
news of Dr. King‘s incarceration, black novelist John A. Williams wrote, ―The death of Martin
King in the state public work camp was imminent.‖105 King‘s wife, Coretta, was five months
pregnant at the time of the sentencing, and physically broke down in the courthouse upon hearing
the fate of her husband. She later recalled her emotional state as being one of desperate fear,
coupled with the recognition that her baby would be born while her husband was in jail.106
Wofford drew up a statement of protest for Kennedy to issue, however Robert rebuffed the idea,
fearing political fallout at such a critical point in the campaign.
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Two days after the ruling in DeKalb, Coretta Scott King called Wofford and told him that
overnight the situation for her husband had taken a turn for the worse. In the middle of the night,
Dr. King had been awoken, removed from his jail cell, shackled, and driven throughout the night
to rural Reidsville state prison. Wofford immediately called Kennedy‘s brother-in-law and
director of the campaign‘s civil rights sector, Sargent Shriver Jr., and explained the situation
regarding King‘s transfer and his wife‘s concerns.107 Author David Niven suggests that by going
directly to Shriver, Wofford intended to circumvent the voices of opposition within the Kennedy
camp and ―prevent the campaign from forming a committee to ponder the electoral ramifications
of the act.‖108 Essentially he was trying to avoid having to gain the approval of RFK. Shriver
tracked Kennedy down in a motel in the Chicago airport and waited until the two of them were
alone. He then told Kennedy:
Why don‘t you telephone Mrs. King and give her your sympathy? Negroes don‘t expect
everything will change tomorrow, no matter who‘s elected. But they do want to know
whether you care. If you telephone Mrs. King, they will know you understand and will
help. You will reach their hearts and give support to a pregnant woman who is afraid her
husband will be killed.109
The call lasted only two minutes, but its political ramifications would have a lasting effect on
the image of Kennedy within the black community.
Once he had Coretta King on the phone, Senator Kennedy greeted her, and said, ―I know
this must be very hard for you. I understand you are expecting a baby, and I just wanted you to
know that I was thinking about you and Dr. King. If there is anything I can do to help, please feel
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free to call me.‖110 After he hung up, JFK left the hotel suite he was staying in and boarded his
campaign plane that was headed for Detroit. While on the plane, he mentioned to his adviser
Pierre Salinger that he had talked with Mrs. King. Salinger immediately informed the Senator‘s
campaign manager and brother, Robert Kennedy.
Robert was outraged and disgusted with Shriver, Wofford, and Martin. Infuriated, he
called them into his office and berated them. Wofford recalls Kennedy yelling ―You bombthrowers probably lost the election…you‘ve probably lost three states…the civil rights section
isn‘t going to do another damn thing in this campaign.‖111 He lectured the two men on their
insubordination, as well as for pushing his brother into a potentially explosive controversy with
only weeks remaining before Election Day. His order for the civil rights section was quite
explicit; they were to create no literature or press releases on the matter. Yet, when Louis Martin
described King‘s midnight transfer to Reidsville, RFK answered quizzically, ―How could they do
that? Who‘s the judge? You can‘t deny bail on a misdemeanor.‖ Martin explained to him that
the judge wanted to make an example out of Dr. King. Frustrated by the possibility of a backlash
against his brother, he talked to his aide John Seigenthaler and asked him what he could do to
draw fire away from JFK.112
Already Robert was re-establishing his familiar role as protector. The call itself was not
what upset RFK, nor did he disagree with the gesture. In his eyes the peculiarities that were
evident in the handling of the King case were inexcusable. However, his mindset was solely
focused on the success of his brother, and therefore any problem that jeopardized that success
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was intolerable. His role as protector usurped any injustice that was affecting a high profile civil
rights leader. John had the luxury of viewing the issue in purely moralistic terms. To JFK, what
was happening to Dr. King and his wife was unjust, and therefore should be addressed. Robert,
on the other hand, had to place the issue in proper perspective, weighing the possible outcomes
that taking a direct stand could have in the eyes of fellow politicians and the voting public on his
brother‘s bid for election.
That night, John was getting off of his campaign plane in New York when a reporter
from the New York Times asked him if he had indeed called Mrs. King earlier that day. Kennedy
responded that she was a friend of his, and that he was concerned about the situation. This
confirmation allowed the Times to break the story of the call to Coretta Scott King.113 Picking up
on the story, the Atlanta Constitution ran a front page article that included Mrs. King‘s
recollection of the event. In the article, she was quoted as saying, ―It certainly made me feel good
that he had called me personally and let me know how he felt. I had the feeling that if he was that
much concerned, he would do what he could to see that Mr. King is let out of jail.‖ Regarding
Vice President Nixon‘s response to the situation, Mrs. King said, ―He‘s been very quiet.‖114
Following Dr. King‘s arrest, the Kennedy brothers had discussed possible avenues which
they could pursue in order to have him released. They recognized that inaction could be more
harmful than action, yet they also understood that they could risk losing southern white support.
Politically, the incarceration of a prominent black civil rights leader cast the southern Democrats
in a bad light. Neither Kennedy brother wanted to allow Richard Nixon and the Republicans the
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opportunity to point that fact out to the voting public. They agreed that the best scenario would
be to have King set free in the most discreet manner possible.
JFK contacted Georgia Governor Vandiver and discussed the issue. Vandiver was aware
of the embarrassment that King‘s imprisonment had caused his state, and he agreed to make
some phone calls for Kennedy. The governor got in contact with the Secretary of the State
Senate, George D. Stewart. Stewart and the judge in charge of the King case, Oscar Mitchell,
were good friends and former classmates. Stewart discussed the matter with Judge Mitchell, who
in turn agreed to have King released with the stipulation that he could say one of the Kennedy
brothers had called him and asked him to do it. As a segregationist judge, Mitchell did not want
to appear weak, and a Kennedy call would be the perfect political cover. Upon hearing of the
judge‘s request, Vandiver phoned John Kennedy, who consented and ordered his brother to make
the call to the judge to demand King‘s release.115
The following morning, Louis Martin was awoken by a phone call from Robert. RFK told
him, ―Louis, I wanted you especially to know that I called that judge in Georgia today, to try to
get Dr. King out.‖ By making the call to Vandiver, Robert was demonstrating a clear pragmatic
approach to the crisis. He was wary of the political repercussions that could result from his
brother‘s actions, and realized that it was necessary to take steps that would ensure minimal
damage towards the national perception of the Democratic candidate. As Harris Wofford
reflected on the matter, ―If King had remained in jail, the Senator‘s call to Mrs. King might have
seemed a symbol without substance- the worst fate for any symbolic act.‖116
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Martin Luther King Jr. was released from prison on October 27, and although he would
not openly endorse Kennedy, his father Marin Luther King Sr. publicly rescinded his pledge to
vote for Richard Nixon.117 In a speech to the congregation of Ebenezer Baptist Church, King Sr.
said, ―It took courage to call my daughter-in-law at a time like this. He has the moral courage to
stand up for what he knows is right. I‘ve got all my votes and I‘ve got a suitcase, and I‘m going
to take them up there and dump them in his lap.‖118
The next day the New York Times, Atlanta Constitution, and Chicago Tribune all featured
front page stories about King‘s release from prison. Each article discussed Judge Mitchell‘s
statements regarding pressure to release King coming from a member of the Kennedy family; the
Constitution even quoted Mitchell‘s remarks about that pressure coming from a brother of the
Senator from Massachusetts.119 While attention from the mainstream white media quickly turned
to other issues following King‘s release, African American newspapers who openly endorsed the
Kennedy-Johnson ticket saw an opportunity to separate their candidate from Nixon. These
papers effectively utilized the phone calls to bolster their support of a candidate whom they
could now portray as being compassionate enough to personally aid a major civil rights figure
and his family in a time of crisis.
The coverage which was given by these newspapers for the Kennedy calls helped to
shape the image of the presidential candidate within black communities as a man who was
willing to not only take the moral high ground, but also have the character to back up his rhetoric
with action. In stark contrast, the image of Richard Nixon was that of a man of inaction, a
candidate who did not hold the plight of black people in high regard. By his own accounts,
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Nixon had considered making a public statement supporting King during his imprisonment but
had been advised not to comment. In his personal memoirs, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, ―I
always felt that Nixon lost a real opportunity to express support of something much larger than
an individual, because this expressed support for the movement for civil rights. It indicated the
direction that this man would take, if he became president.‖120 The Kennedy phone calls would
serve as a catalyst to clearly separate the two candidates on the issue of civil rights. Several years
after the election, Richard Nixon would recall the events of October, 1960 saying, ―I thought my
civil rights record was good. I thought I had won many friends among Negroes, but then the Rev.
Martin Luther King Jr. case came up. The Democrats whipped up a fury in Negro areas. I was
painted a villain.‖121
Only two days after the Times had broken the story of the call to Coretta King, the proKennedy black newspapers the Afro-American, Chicago Defender, and Pittsburgh Courier all
ran inserts discussing the Democratic candidate‘s civil rights record. The insert led off with a
quote from the executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NCAAP), Roy Wilkins. He said, ―The Senator‘s record, taken as a whole… must be
regarded…as one of the best voting records on civil rights and related issues of any Senator in
Congress.‖122 This was in sharp contrast to Wilkins heavy criticism of Kennedy following his
1957 vote for the jury trial amendment. However, the change in rhetoric demonstrates the desire
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of the black community to unify around a common political figure who on the surface appeared
to be capable of pushing forward the agenda for the advancement of black rights.123
Following the lead of the Courier, the Afro-American ran a series of articles pertaining to
the Kennedy calls and the subsequent reaction from civil rights leaders. Based in Maryland, the
paper‘s national edition had major distribution centers within the battleground states of
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey. On November 5, the paper ran a front page spread
entitled ―It‘s Kennedy: Afro’s Choice for President.‖ This article openly endorsed the KennedyJohnson ticket, citing Kennedy‘s stellar civil rights voting record in Congress, as well as plans
for future civil rights legislation. The article stated, ―Kennedy sees the presidency as an
opportunity to turn into a living reality the American vision of a free society in which no man has
to suffer discrimination based on race…no presidential candidate has made a more forthright
statement on Civil Rights.‖124
For many black voters, the Kennedy calls came to represent something more significant
than the simple actions that they were. In the eyes of the black community, they represented a
beacon of hope that promised their segregated society an opportunity for equality in the near
future. The calls themselves, however, had little to do with morality or human suffering. Instead,
at their core they represented the principles and foundation that lay at the heart of the Kennedy
campaign strategy. They were politically opportunistic moments that were capitalized and then
exploited by the Kennedy camp. The evolution of Robert‘s perception of racial inequality had
yet to broaden to a true understanding of what the civil rights movement really meant. The
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frustration and incessant desire for equality felt by African-Americans at this point did not exist
in the world of the Kennedys. RFK approached problems of race in the same moralistic manner
that he had the incidents at Harvard and UVA Law.125 He simply saw an unjust situation and set
out to rectify it, more conscious of the moral ramifications than the social ones. The only
difference in this approach, was that during the 1960 campaign he had to be mindful of the
implications that such action would have on the political aspirations of his brother. Both John
and Robert felt that the incarceration of King was unjust, but there reaction to that event was
calculated in a manner that would yield the most positive results for the Democratic nominee.
Like the Wofford platform at the party convention and the heightened rhetoric in favor of
black equality, the Kennedy phone calls served to raise the level of African-Americans
expectations of the incoming administration to lead with a firm and authoritative moral edge that
had yet to be seen in the White House. In the end, the Kennedy approach to winning the election
paid off, but concordantly created a new set of problems in the arena of civil rights that would
not be as easily solved through the inherent pragmatic approach to politics that they had
previously relied on.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PRESIDENCY: A LEGACY OF INACTION 1960-1962

The Freedom Rides
Weeks after the inauguration, the newly appointed Attorney General Robert Kennedy met
with Dr. King and suggested that it was too soon to ask for any sort of civil rights legislation.126
In his memoirs, Harris Wofford wrote of the president‘s continual inaction in constructing civil
rights legislation, ―What disappointed me most was not so much the President‘s recurring
decision to wait…as the way he made the decision- each time hurriedly, at the last minute,
without careful consideration of an overall strategy.‖127 Following the election, however, events
had already begun to unfold that would immediately test the administrations civil rights policy.
The first major civil rights crisis that the Kennedy administration encountered came
during the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Freedom Rides of 1961. Feeling that the
movement had an ally in the White House, CORE director James Farmer announced that a small
integrated group would ride buses into the segregated South, and peacefully gain entry to
segregated bus terminals, thus forcing the issue of desegregation within those terminals. As a
result of a December 1960 Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation in bus and train
terminals involved in interstate transportation, Farmer thought that the Freedom Rides could
create a crisis that would leave the federal government in a position in which they would have to
take action.128 The itinerary for the trip included leaving Washington D.C. on May 4, and
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arriving in New Orleans on May 17, the anniversary of the historic Brown vs. Board of
Education decision.129
Two days after the Freedom Rides began, Robert Kennedy delivered an address at the
University of Georgia during the celebration of Law Day. Kennedy‘s speech was indicative of
how his office would confront the civil rights crises when he said:
We know that the law is the glue that holds civilization together. And, we know that if
one man‘s rights are denied, the rights of all are endangered. In our country the courts
have a most important role in safeguarding these rights. The decisions of the courts,
however much we might disagree with them, in the final analysis must be followed and
respected…Respect for the Law, in essence that is the meaning of Law Day and every
day must be Law Day or else our society will collapse.130
His words would be tested a week later, when the Freedom Riders arrived in Anniston, Alabama
on May 14. Their bus was firebombed by a white mob, while the riders themselves were dragged
into the street and maliciously beaten. Although the Kennedy brother‘s immediate reaction to the
violence was one of shock, they were also aware of how that violence would reflect on the new
presidency.131 The attorney general thought that attempts by civil rights leaders such as King and
Farmer were meant to antagonize and embarrass his brother‘s administration. As a result, RFK
called Wofford, who now served as JFK‘s special assistant on civil rights, and told him, ―Tell
them to call it off! Stop them! Get your friends off those buses...It‘s embarrassing us before the
world, Stop it!‖132
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After the attorney general had arranged for a replacement bus for the Freedom Riders, a
new group of activists continued the journey to Montgomery, Alabama.133 There they were met
with even more brutal white mob violence than had been seen in Anniston. RFK‘s closest aide,
John Seigenthaler, drove by the scene in order to gather information and report back to
Washington. He attempted to help a black woman escape the mob, and was subsequently
knocked unconscious by a white man wielding a metal pipe.134 Despite this instance of brutality,
the president continually disregarded suggestions by his aides to send federal troops to intervene.
Instead, he chose to adopt a more passive route and had Robert initiate legal proceedings in
federal court to stop Alabama‘s injunction against the rides. At the same time, he also telephoned
southern congressmen and governors, ensuring them that the administration would not support
the Freedom Rides, but would provide them with the protection that the law stipulated.135 The
Kennedy brothers were implementing their typical political strategy of playing both sides of an
issue in order to appease each party involved. The president thought that the agenda of civil
rights was being forced upon him, and he was not prepared to publicly deal with it during the
initial year of his presidency. Although he was frustrated by the developments in Alabama, he
did issue a public statement on the matter saying:
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The situation which has developed in Alabama is a source of the deepest concern to me
as it must be to the vast majority of the citizens of Alabama and other Americans. I have
instructed the Justice Department to take all necessary steps based on their investigations
and information…I hope that state and local officials in Alabama will meet their
responsibilities. The United States Government intends to meet its.136
Having come out with a definitive statement on the Freedom Rides, JFK and his brother
privately hoped that further confrontation could be avoided. Against the attorney general‘s
wishes, however, Martin Luther King went to Montgomery to personally offer his support to the
Riders. Once there, he led a worship service at the First Baptist Church with a group of the
Freedom Riders and over 1,500 sympathizers. With only fifty U.S. marshals protecting the
church, a mob of over 3,000 whites began burning cars and throwing crude fire bombs at the
building.137
Once again the president considered the possibility of sending federal troops into
Alabama. RFK on the other hand, feared that the situation would dissipate into a scene of
violence, and therefore advised his brother not to send the Army. In an attempt to temper the
escalating crisis, the president ordered unmarked federal marshals carrying tear gas to move in
and disperse the mob. Alabama National Guardsmen were called in by Governor John Patterson
only when the governor had heard that there was a possibility of intervention from federal troops.
Many of the Alabama Guardsmen were as racist as the white mob that they were trying to
prevent from entering the church. As a result, King and those trapped inside the church were
forced to stay there throughout the night. The crisis ended the following morning when the
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Justice Department negotiated safe passage out of the Church for the riders and their
supporters.138
What the Freedom Rides proved to the Kennedys, was that the focus of any civil rights
movement should not be on public displays of protest or resistance that could lead to unwanted
confrontations between the federal government and southern state and local officials. The
Kennedy brothers were just as willing as state officials to avoid having to be forced into using
the military to enforce civil rights. Instead, the administration made it a point that the focus
should not be on inflammatory demonstrations. They continued to stress that the proper path to
black equality must be achieved through gradual means. Discussing the course that the president
wanted to set, historian Bruce Miroff writes:
[JFK] wanted to see racial justice attained, he was not so sure he wanted it attained along
the lines that the civil rights movement was developing…what mattered to him was that
their actions were unpredictable, perpetually threatening to immerse him in situations for
which his pragmatic approach was ill prepared.139
To the Kennedys, the only clear way in which they could dictate the pace of the
movement while avoiding possible confrontations, was by placing an emphasis on black voter
registration.140 On June 16, RFK met with a group of civil rights leaders and made the case to
them that public demonstrations such as the Freedom Rides were not a productive way to create
social change. In place of such protests, Kennedy offered the full support of the Justice
Department to protect and uphold the rights of civil rights activists who wanted to register to
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vote.141 He would later be quoted as saying, ―I felt strongly about the fact that voting was at the
heart of the problem. If enough Negroes registered, they could obtain redress of their grievance
internally, without the federal government involved in it at all.‖142 Regardless of what the
Kennedys deemed appropriate civil rights activism, what the events in Montgomery did do was
to set the precedent for the initial years of the presidency, in which the White House was willing
to rely on the action of state officials to resolve confrontations within their own states. If
challenged by those state officials, as in the case of the Freedom Rides and later in the standoffs
at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama, then they would reluctantly take federal action in
the most discrete way possible. In their first test of civil rights, the Kennedys had deliberately
sidestepped the strong moral commitment that had been promised throughout the presidential
campaign. Neither brother had grasped the severity of the problem of black inequality.
Reflecting on Robert‘s attitudes towards the Riders and their persistence in their journey,
journalist Jack Newfield said, ―I think he [RFK] was slow and late getting it, about the Civil
Rights Movement. Robert Kennedy was saying what most of the establishment said in that
period, it‘s a good idea but it‘s the wrong time.‖ The Freedom Rides would be the first in a line
of passive responses from the White House that would serve to continually frustrate and anger
civil rights activists throughout the tenure of the Kennedy presidency.
The Integration of Ole Miss

Following the events in Alabama, the president was hesitant in his willingness to make a
strong public commitment towards civil rights legislation, as he did not want to risk alienating
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southern Democrats who were running for re-election in Congress in the fall of 1962, and who
would support his own presidential re-election campaign.143 For civil rights leaders, the
momentum that had been carried from the Freedom Rides was disrupted by events in the city of
Albany, Georgia. Under the direction of King, a coalition between his SCLC, the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and CORE designed a campaign whose ultimate
goal was to end segregation in Albany. Their plan was to organize as many large scale sit-ins and
demonstrations as possible in order to cause such disruptions in the day to day functioning of the
city that Albany officials would be forced to integrate facilities such as bus and railroad
stations.144 Despite the unrelenting commitment of activists, Albany officials refused to budge,
and inevitably the movement was abandoned. King was infuriated by the Kennedy
administrations lack of involvement in the Albany movement.145 An emissary of black ministers
sent by King to discuss the failing effort in Albany arrived at the White House on August 6 and
was abruptly turned away. With city commissioners threatening to enforce the city‘s
segregationist laws more forcefully if protests continued, King implored the White House to
make a resolute statement in support of the activists. Kennedy remained silent on the issue, as the
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Albany campaign had already been deemed a failure and the administration was looking to avoid
a possibly explosive confrontation with Albany city officials over civil rights.146
Throughout the month of August, 1962 and well into September, a rash of black church
bombings and violence against SNCC voter registration volunteers spread throughout the South.
On September 10 in Ruleville, Mississippi, a group of white men fired shots into two homes
which provided shelter for volunteers in the SNCC registration campaign. The use of fear tactics
such as these shootings by racist whites succeeded in forcing SNCC volunteers out of the city. 147
Days after the Ruleville shootings, President Kennedy held a press conference in which
he addressed the use of fear tactics by racist whites in the South, as well as the efforts to register
voters in Albany. In his speech, JFK directed his focus towards the ―cowardly and outrageous‖
southern terrorists saying:
I don‘t know any more outrageous action which I‘ve seen in this country for a good many
months or years than the burning of a church- two churches- because of the effort made
by Negroes, to be registered to vote…I commend those who are making the effort to
register every citizen. They deserve the protection of the United States Government, the
protection of the states…And if it requires extra legislation, and extra force, we shall do
that.148
In his work Parting the Waters, Taylor Branch suggests that this speech was Kennedy‘s
strongest statement on civil rights since his election. He writes, ―Given a shining opportunity to
address the issues at the center of the administrations civil rights strategy- violence and voting
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rights- Kennedy responded unequivocally.‖149 Dr. King was very pleased to hear the president
finally take a stance for their cause. If JFK was beginning to show support for the victims of the
attacks, then it might be possible for him to further push the idea for civil rights legislation. At a
prayer service at the ruins of one of the bombed churches, he spoke about the meaning behind
Kennedy‘s words, saying, ―We appreciate the strong and forthright words from the President of
our nation. We need his moral support. We are praying that these words will be translated into
powerful action.‖150
Yet, despite the powerful rhetoric, Kennedy continued to balk at the opportunity to issue
any sort of civil rights legislation. Dr. King had been hoping that either the planned federal
celebration for the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22 in Washington
DC, or possibly a second ceremony on the January 1 celebration would be the perfect stage for
the president to end all segregation. On May 17, 1962 King formally delivered a draft of his own
proposed second Emancipation Proclamation to the White House. Much to his dismay, his idea
to adapt Lincoln‘s own executive order to the needs of the African-American race one hundred
years later by abolishing all southern segregation statutes was met with silence by the
president.151 As the events involving civil rights activists continued to dominate a national debate
in the black and white press, President Kennedy‘s hesitation towards issuing legislation steadily
increased, evident by his reluctance to address neither publicly nor privately King‘s draft
proclamation.
Dr. King turned his attention to RFK, hoping that the Justice Department would be more
willing to provide assistance to civil rights activists. Yet as the point man for the administration‘s
149
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civil rights agenda, the attorney general continually aggravated King with his refusal to allow the
civil rights leader to dictate Kennedy policy. RFK was steadfast in his strategy to encourage
voter registration over direct activism. Harris Wofford recalled that while the two men could not
see eye to eye in terms of the goals, pace and direction of the movement, they still held a mutual
understanding that they were facing a similar foe in segregation. Wofford commented:
The tension between King and Bob was inevitable. Here was this uncontrollable force, a
moral force, a person who was as much his own man as Robert Kennedy was. Bob liked
to control his agenda, and King‘s business was to overthrow people‘s agendas. King, I
think, worried about Bobby. He worried that he wasn‘t morally committed enough. He
didn‘t sense the passion in Bobby. On the other hand he had great hope that Bobby‘s
readiness to use power would be turned to Civil Rights.152
John Seigenthaler shared a similar view of the relationship that developed between Kennedy and
King. He reflected, ―Bob recognized the need for dramatic manifestations of civil rights work,
but also the need for a very basic and pragmatic approach to the political problem…their was a
shade of difference in their approach, but each recognized the good faith of the other.‖153
At this point, however, Robert Kennedy was unwilling to provide the full extent of his
power as the attorney general. The hostility of white southerners towards the Freedom Riders
shocked RFK, and as a result the Justice Department as a whole began to back off criminal
prosecutions against those who violated voting rights of blacks in the South, fearing similar
demonstrations of violence. In a meeting with civil rights leaders, Burke Marshall warned that as
a result of limited federal powers, the Justice Department could no longer provide protection
guarantees to registration programs in the South. King and other civil right activists were
frustrated with the Kennedy administration, claiming that they had led them down a path towards
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voter registration simply because they were aware that in this area they had minimal authority
and power.154
The same month as the centennial celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation, a civil
rights crisis came to a head in Oxford, Mississippi. On January 21, 1961 an African-American
student named James H. Meredith applied for admission to the University of Mississippi. Despite
meeting all required qualifications for attendance, Ole Miss officially denied his admission.
Meredith immediately brought suit against the academic institution in a federal district court with
the help of lawyers representing the NAACP. By early September 1962, federal courts ruled that
Meredith had the legal right to attend the university. State officials in Mississippi, led by
Governor Ross Barnett, strongly objected to the courts decision. Barnett declared that all state
officials, himself included, should be willing to go to jail if necessary to prevent Meredith‘s
admission.155 The governor even appeared on statewide television asking his constituents to join
him in opposing the federal government‘s policy of destroying the white race, or as he called it
―racial genocide.‖156 What began to unfold was an inevitable clash regarding the limitations of
federal intervention with the functions of individual states. President Kennedy faced the daunting
task of blending the will of the federal government with that of the individual states. As a result,
the White House became even more cautious towards becoming entrenched in a legal and
ideological struggle with officials in Mississippi.
Regardless of their hesitation, the Kennedy administration was steadfast in their
determination to not to allow state officials the opportunity to dictate the outcome of the conflict
at Ole Miss. On September 20, Attorney General Kennedy secured a safe escort of U.S. Marshals
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and Justice Department attorneys for Meredith to the campus. 157 Upon arrival at the university,
Barnett (who had been appointed by the Ole Miss Board of Trustees as a special registrar to deal
with Meredith) was given a federal injunction by a Justice Department attorney which directed
the registrar to admit Meredith. Ignoring the injunction, the governor proceeded to deny the
young black man admission.158 Barnett‘s actions left RFK with few options. The following day
the Justice Department filed a contempt of court citation against the university‘s chancellor,
registrar, and dean, and obtained permission from the Court of Appeals to take over the case for
Meredith in order to ensure the execution of the law.159 While Barnett attempted to maintain a
political front of a southern leader who was unwilling to lose credibility with his constituents and
southern colleagues by bending to pressure from federal demands, Kennedy continued to do
everything in his power to avoid direct intervention. The administration was wary of evoking the
memory of President Eisenhower sending the military into Little Rock, Arkansas in order to
desegregate schools in 1957. In this situation, both Kennedy brothers wanted to ―appear to be
exercising minimum power.‖160
On September 30, RFK finally brokered a deal with Barnett that would allow Meredith to
register. He was able to do so by threatening the governor, telling him he would release tapes of
earlier negotiations between the two that the attorney general had secretly recorded throughout
September. These tapes showed that Barnett had been working with the Kennedy administration
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throughout the entire standoff. Not wanting to lose face in front of mounting political pressure,
Barnett consented to Meredith‘s entry to the university, which ultimately led to mob violence
and the death of two people.161
Despite the dramatic events and violent outbursts in Oxford, the Kennedys continued to
prefer indirect action through political process, which they believed would better serve the
movement by means of gradual change. In his work, President Kennedy: Profile of Power,
Richard Reeves comments:
From the President‘s perspective, the problem with civil rights was that the Negroes and
their white friends were pushing the most fundamental kind of attack on the status quo.
Their righteous expectations, in that view, were based on an unrealistic political premise,
thinking that the President alone had the power to persuade millions of free people- the
whites- to do something they did not want to do.162

Most important in the minds of African-Americans in the wake of Ole Miss, however, was the
national exposure which the events had brought in forcing the hand of the administration to take
any type of action, regardless of whether it was direct or indirect. In a front page editorial in the
Chicago Defender, Lloyd L. General commented, ―[Meredith] was still being denied by bigots,
but he had won battle after battle and he stood ready to face whatever struggles that lay ahead...in
doing so he had thrust upon the federal government its obligation to protect the rights of its
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citizens.‖163 At the same time, though, some felt that the administration‘s reaction to the crisis in
Oxford was setting a dangerous model for federal government intervention in response to civil
rights confrontations. The Chicago Defender wrote, ―The Justice Department‘s failure to act with
dispatch against Gov. Barnett‘s bold defiance of Federal court orders has set an unhealthy
precedent for those who wish to thumb their noses at the law.‖164 This precedent which the
newspaper spoke of reflected the continued reliance on political maneuvering to pacify the
problem of civil rights which allowed the administration to avoid complete chaos and violence to
erupt on a much larger scale.
A result of the crisis however, was the recognition by JFK of the extent to which southern
segregationists were prepared to go in order to maintain their social structure and traditions. In a
report that was issued by the Mississippi legislature discussing the events at Ole Miss, federal
marshals were blamed for instigating and planning physical torture against the students of the
university. The president was stunned by the report and the interpretation of the violent clashes,
and began to question how southerners truly envisioned the consequences of segregation. He
commented to Ted Sorensen, ―It makes me wonder whether everything I learned about the evils
of Reconstruction was really true.‖165
For the Kennedys, the situation in Oxford had deteriorated to a point in which they were
uncomfortable in having to take such direct action. As RFK would later say, ―I was trying to
avoid basically having to send troops and trying to avoid having a federal presence in
Mississippi…Barnett was trying to accomplish avoidance of integration…if he couldn‘t do that,
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then he would be forced to do it by our heavy hand.‖166 Rather than take the initiative by calling
in federal troops in a public show of force, the Kennedys preferred to continue their policy of
private negotiations and political appeasement to resolve crises such as this. Neither the president
nor his brother was pleased with the circumstances that had brought about the confrontation in
Oxford which forced their intervention. The deliberate and dramatic defiance by AfricanAmericans such as Meredith forced the president to respond. These actions were continually
frowned upon by both the president and attorney general, who viewed political maneuvering in
pragmatic terms. Direct challenges by activists placed the Kennedys in an awkward position in
which the events dictated their decision making rather than vice versa, a position which the
brothers were uncomfortable with. The administration recognized that whether they wanted it or
not, the reality was that civil rights had become an integral part of their political agenda. Yet as
their hesitation during the crisis of Ole Miss demonstrates, they were still not prepared to make a
full federal commitment towards the cause of civil rights, nor were they in complete agreement
on how best to deal with such situations.
****
African-Americans had high hopes that Kennedy would follow up on his campaign
promise to put forward civil rights legislation. However, after three years of inaction in both the
creation of that legislation and the administrations lack of commitment in aiding civil rights
activists in the South, the black community had become disillusioned, realizing that real change
in the form of federal aid would most likely not come. The Chicago Defender summarized these
feelings in an editorial in which the author commented, ―I have believed all along that Mr.
Kennedy is insincere on civil rights; that he thinks the Negro can be fooled by political
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appointments, White House parties and pretty words. From a look at the record, it would appear
that the honeymoon between JFK and the Negro is turning sour.‖167
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CHAPTER 5
THE NORTH: WHEN I PULL THE TRIGGER…KISS IT GOODBYE

The South Exposed at Birmingham

The spring of 1963 brought about a new crisis that once again thrust the civil rights
movement into the national forefront. Following the failure in Albany, Martin Luther King and
Fred Shuttlesworth organized a series of protests in Birmingham, Alabama in early April.
Similar to the events in Georgia, these demonstrations were largely unsuccessful as a result of
the passive containment strategy of city officials, including Police Chief Bull Connor and Mayor
Albert Boutwell. Birmingham police avoided direct confrontations with activists, and the bulk of
the protests were localized within African-American neighborhoods. Civil rights organizers in
the city became increasingly frustrated by the lack of gains. Up to this point, the presence of the
national press had been virtually nonexistent in the city. King and Shuttlesworth realized that
they needed the media to become actively involved if they were going to relate the message of
the civil rights struggle to the nation and evoke some sort of emotional response which could
provide the outrage necessary to force the federal government into action. As a result,
Shuttlesworth traveled to Washington D.C. and appeared before the National Press Club in order
to encourage the media to go to Birmingham and cover the events and efforts of the protesters.168
On May 2, after lackluster results and few arrests, King and Shuttlesworth made the bold
decision to flood department stores and lunch counters with thousands of child protesters. Bull
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Connor‘s men responded to the demonstration by turning high pressure hoses and police dogs on
the children.169
The national media captured images of the excessive police brutality towards the
Birmingham protesters, prompting President Kennedy to comment upon seeing pictures of the
violence on the front page of the New York Times, ―I think it‘s a terrible picture in the
paper…It‘s an intolerable situation…we worked as hard as we possibly could given the laws we
had. We have not done enough for a situation so desperate…I quite agree if I was a Negro I‘d be
sore.‖170 The photographs made the president uncomfortable with the direction that the crisis in
Birmingham had taken, yet he came away with no concrete plan that would help to rectify the
situation. His pragmatism dictated that the situation in Alabama be resolved, but more as a
political strategy than as a moralistic stance. He was more concerned with how the Soviet Union
would perceive the pictures of violence, and how that would effect Cold War foreign relations as
a result.171 This view was evident by a comment made during a meeting with a group of lobbyists
that morning, in which JFK stated, ―There is no federal law we could pass…I mean what law can
you pass to do anything about police power in Birmingham?...What a disaster that picture is.
That picture is not only in America but all around the world.‖172 Historian Nick Bryant writes
that Kennedy‘s discussion with the lobbyist group encapsulated the president‘s narrow view of
one of the most extraordinary episodes of the entire civil rights era. Bryant argues that although
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the Birmingham protests had been a watershed moment for the country, it was not for the
president.
In the days following the attack on the children, the White House was flooded with calls
from various organizations and civic leaders urging the president to utilize the powers of his
office to the fullest. New York Representative Emmanuel Celler petitioned the president, calling
the actions of Birmingham‘s police ―barbarous‖, and advised Kennedy to exhibit ―firm executive
action.‖173 JFK was unable, however, to grasp the greater scope that the events of Birmingham
symbolized, that of the emerging public awareness of the brutality and injustice of segregation.
What resulted instead was a subtle shift in tactics by the administration in their approach to civil
rights, from that of conflict management to that of proactive conflict resolution.174 SCLC‘s Rev.
Andrew J Young commented on the effectiveness of this new strategy, ―Up to that point,
settlements in civil rights had involved the courts, or some kind of presidential order, or
something very official. But now you began to get a kind of unofficial, personal reconciliation
with both blacks and whites, which was very new.‖175
In an effort to prevent further violence, President Kennedy incorporated this new strategy
by sending Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall to Alabama to secretly negotiate a peace
between local white and black businessmen. By May 10, Marshall was able to broker a deal
between the two sides that would result in the gradual desegregation of lunch counters, rest
rooms, and theaters throughout the city.176 Despite the success in gaining integration in the city,
the black press, for the most part unaware of the behind the scenes negotiations by the
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administration, responded with criticism to the lack of direct public intervention and support by
the Kennedy brothers. The Chicago Defender wrote:
The Kennedy Administration has reached the moment of truth on the burning issue of
civil rights…But tokenism will not satisfy the swelling chorus of indignation which is
directed against an Administration which…fails to take action when Negro ministers and
teen-aged Negro children are knocked to the ground by high pressure water hoses and
bitten by police dogs.177

Hopes of a peaceful resolution following the negotiations by Marshall were left in doubt
after the bombing of activist Rev. A.D. King‘s house. No longer willing to adhere to the ideals of
non-violence, enraged African-Americans in Birmingham took to the streets and began rioting
within their own community. The clashes between black rioters and city police resulted in the
stabbing of a white police officer.178 Although a political shift of power within the city resulting
in Bull Connor leaving office allowed the Birmingham agreement to hold, once again the course
of action and silence from the White House came under criticism by the African-American press.
The Chicago Defender wrote, ―The President- like his predecessor, General Eisenhower,
inevitably waits until the fat is in the fire before making decisive moves. He did it in the James
Meredith situation. He did it in Birmingham.‖179
Violence continued to spread throughout the South in the weeks following the
Birmingham agreement as riots broke out in Jackson, Mississippi. Angered by white official‘s
refusal to create a bi-racial committee and employ black policemen, blacks in Jackson clashed
with police.180 In order to resolve the situation, the president made a series of private phone calls
to Jackson mayor Allen Thompson and negotiated a resolution to defuse the racial tensions
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within the city. He told Allen, ―[blacks] have to look like when they call off these demonstrations
that they‘re getting somewhere. Now it should be possible in this meeting to work out some
language which would save your situation and at the same time not make it look like they‘ve all
quit.‖181 Although John F. Kennedy recognized that the introduction of new civil rights
legislation was inevitable, he still believed that the best way to resolve these situations was
through case by case political negotiation, in what the Afro-American called the Kennedy
―velvet-glove technique.‖182
A New Front Emerges
A significant turning point in the path towards the creation of civil rights legislation that
directly resulted from the rioting in the South, was the recognition by the Kennedy
administration that their policy of appeasement and containment would yield minimal results in
creating genuine lasting change for blacks and their pursuit of equality. An important difference
that resulted from the Birmingham crisis as opposed to previous events was the impression left
on the Kennedy administration, as well as the rest of the nation, of black rioters utilizing violence
as an outlet for their mounting frustration. Although the president and his advisers had focused
solely on gaining immediate results from the conflict, it was Robert Kennedy who suggested that
the administration begin to broaden the scope of their civil rights strategy. Discussing the issue
with his brother, Robert said:
The group that has gotten out of hand has been the Negroes, by and large…We feel that
based on the success that they had in Birmingham, and the feeling of the Negroes
generally, and the reports that we get from other cities, not just in the South, that this
could trigger off a good deal of violence around the country now. The Negroes‘ saying
that they have been abused for all these years, and they are going to have to start
181
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following the ideas of the Black Muslims, not go along with the white people. If they
feel, on the other hand, that the federal government is their friend, and is intervening for
them, is going to work for them, this could head some of that off.183

RFK recognized that the violent response of those in Birmingham was not an anomaly, and that
an ideological shift in tactics away from passivism was gaining a strong foothold within the
black community that would be difficult to contain.
The Kennedy administration also realized that the problems of racial equality and the
threat of black violence were not limited exclusively to the South. The attorney general would
note in a speech to the New York City Central Labor Council, ―There is no question that
segregation in the South is socially, politically and morally wrong. But there is deep-seated
segregation in the North, also, and it is just as wrong.‖184 Racial tensions were rising amongst
African-Americans throughout northern cities, and would have to be dealt with by the president.
The frustration of blacks in the North was evident in the writings and words of prominent figures
such as novelist James Baldwin and Dr. Kenneth Clark. In an interview for U.S. News, Clark
discussed the mindset of blacks in northern urban communities. He commented, ―The mood of
the Negro today is that he must have the same rights that every other American citizen enjoysno matter what the cost…he wants those rights now. He is tired of waiting.‖185
At the center of the rising tensions and impatience that was becoming apparent to the
Kennedy administration was the system of de facto segregation. This type of segregation had its
basis economically, creating a system that trapped blacks in a state of poverty while providing
minimal opportunities for advancement. In 1948 the Supreme Court outlawed racially restrictive
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housing covenants. Despite this ruling, however, established white ethnic groups, such as the
Irish, Italian and Jewish, who controlled housing made private pledges to not sell or lease to
blacks in order to maintain racial hegemony within their own neighborhoods. The practice of
―redlining‖ was also an obstacle that blacks seeking housing had to face. Redlining was a form
of discrimination in which bankers and mortgage brokers would circle areas on city maps in red
pencil which they regarded as too insecure to grant mortgages. Real estate brokers agreed that
they would not show potential black homeowners any housing outside of these penciled off
areas. Thus blacks were forced to seek housing in dilapidated tenement projects within the red
line, paying premium prices with inflated interest rates that could consume a majority of their
household incomes.186
In a similar fashion, opportunities for employment were also limited. Most northern
blacks who worked were usually confined to jobs which had little chance for advancement, jobs
such as unskilled industrial laborers. With limited housing available, the arrival of over a million
blacks in northern ghettos during the 1960s led to overcrowding and a high rate of
unemployment throughout the black community. Historian Robert Weisbrot writes that this type
of segregation created resentment in northern blacks, since ―no Jim Crow laws advertised their
agony or stirred protests that aroused national concern. Instead racism worked in subtler ways to
make ghetto residents the forgotten people of the Negro revolution.‖187 This environment of
hopelessness and poverty fueled feelings of resentment, anger, and limitless frustration that
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would inevitably be released through means of violence and brutality. James Baldwin, in his
work My Dungeon Shook, wrote of the social barriers that were thrust upon young blacks in the
ghettos. In the essay, written as a letter to his newborn nephew, he observes:
You were born and faced the future that you faced because you were black and for no
other reason. The limits of your ambition were, thus, expected to be set forever. You
were born into a society which spelled out with brutal clarity, and in as many ways as
possible, that you were a worthless human being. You were not expected to aspire to
excellence: you were expected to make peace with mediocrity.188

Civil rights activist James Farmer discussed the plight of a new generation of northern blacks in
1963, saying, ―Walking in the streets of Harlem, I saw more clearly than I have before how
young men who feel that nothing is being done about grievances so deep they can barely
articulate them, will finally spring to violence.‖189
The growing spite that was emerging in northern ghettos and the feeling of desperation
was reflected in the shifting attitude of African-Americans away from the policy of non-violent
passive resistance that was preached by such leaders as Dr. King. Political historian Theodore
Windt describes this shift as part of the natural process of a liberal public protest movement. He
writes that during the initial stages of a mass movement, the purpose of the dominant group of
protesters is to arouse sympathy and support amongst the power elites, which can include the
press and legislators. They appeal to these elites by means of identification, demonstrating a
common belief system of values, while at the same time ensuring them that they have no
intention of usurping the position of the group in power. Part of this development, however, is
the inevitable emergence of radicals who carry a more desperate and inflammatory message that
will amplify the desires of the dominant protest group. Windt describes the appearance of
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radicals as being critical to furthering the message of the dominant group while incorporating
new tactics and ideals that may have stood on the periphery. He writes, ―Even as procedural
politics and deliberative rhetoric govern this period, radicals stand in the background rendering
ideological analyses and wait for the day when others catch up to them or realize the futility of
their rhetoric.‖190
This process, and the turn by many blacks to radical ideology was reflected in northern
urban cities. While the activism of SCLC, CORE, and SNCC dominated the headlines, blacks in
the North found few opportunities that would help to expose their own depravity to a nation
whose main focus was on the plight of the black equality movement in the South. Baldwin
described this shift away from King‘s rhetoric of passivism, and of the leader himself:
[King] is a very great man…He really believes in non-violence. He has arrived at
something in himself which allows him to do it, and he still has great moral authority in
the South. He has none whatsoever in the North. Poor Martin has gone through God
knows what kind of hell to awaken the American conscience, but Martin has reached the
end of his rope…Martin is undercut by the performance of the country. The country is
only concerned about non-violence if it seems as if I‘m going to get violent.191
In an attempt to vent their frustrations, Baldwin felt that many northern black youths were
straying away from the ideals of non-violent resistance, and instead accepting those of the Black
Muslim movement. In stark contrast to King, Baldwin suggested that leaders of the Black
Muslim‘s, such as Malcolm X, had ―great authority over any of his audiences. He corroborates
their reality; He tells them [blacks] that they really exist.‖192 Clark reflected the changing attitude
when he discussed the growing acceptance in the North of the Black Muslim movement saying,
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―Negro youths seem to feel that they can not hope for justice from white Americans…Many of
these youngsters who express to us the Muslim philosophy say ―We‘re not Muslims. But what
the Muslims say is true: You can‘t trust the white man.‖193 Radicals such as the Black Muslims
offered northern blacks a new alternative to the message of pacification of Dr. King and other
mainstream civil rights organizations. These radicals would not accept the political and social
creed of the mainline civil rights movement, much less ―the decorous rhetoric of
supplication.‖194
The emergence of a new radical approach had its roots in the urban ghetto, and its
message was carried by the youthful second generation of activists who were beginning to
emerge in leadership positions in the North. This new generation openly questioned the strategy
of wearing the antagonists down through suffering. The feeling of mistrust and frustration left
northern cities in a precarious state of racial tension, a juxtaposition that contrasted the token
civil rights gains of the South with the desperation and feelings of futility in the North. Radical
activist Julius Lester echoed this sentiment, writing, ―The days of singing freedom songs and the
days of combating bullets and billy clubs with love are over. ‗We Shall Overcome‘ sounds old,
outdated. Man, the people are too busy getting ready to fight to bother with singing anymore.‖195
In response to the growing animosity that was festering amongst northern blacks during
the early months of the summer of 1963, the National Urban League proposed a plan to temper
hostilities that were developing in what they described as ―a tinder-box of racial unrest among
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Negroes in Northern cities that was on the verge of taking flame.‖196 While discussing the plan to
eliminate ghettos and provide more employment to African-American workers, League
executive director Whitney M. Young Jr. publicly criticized JFK for his failure to advance civil
rights legislation. Young asserted that the Kennedys ―have only reacted, they have not acted.
Their attitude has been: How can we keep people from revolting and demonstrating and
embarrassing us?‖197 He went on to say that incidents in the South were, ―mild in comparison
with those…in Northern cities. In these teeming Northern ghettos, hundreds of thousands of
Negro citizens, struggling beneath the mounting burden of automation, overcrowding and subtle
discrimination are reaching their breaking point.‖198 The Chicago Defender mirrored Young‘s
point, commenting, ―A new Negro has arisen on the scene, and he is impatient at…the snail‘s
pace at which integration is moving, the continued token acceptance…are driving the negro
masses to extreme means to attain their equity and full citizenship status.‖199
More than any other member of the Kennedy administration, RFK was aware of the
serious threat that violence from the North could have on race relations throughout the country.
On May 19 he and Burke Marshall met with activist Dick Gregory, and voiced his concerns over
the possibility of a future escalation in northern urban ghettos. On the flight back from the
meeting, Kennedy and Marshall agreed that in order to temper the agitation that was apparent in
the black community, legislation would have to be created which would address public
accommodations.200 Reporting to his brother and his inner circle of advisers the following day,
RFK told the president that Gregory ―thinks we‘re going to have a lot of trouble. He thinks that
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there‘s a complete lack of understanding…that that‘s going to be the big problem area; it‘s going
to be the northern cities.‖201 Burke Marshall added that the key point made by Gregory was that
―the Negro mass in the North, particularly, doesn‘t see anything except the dogs and hoses.‖
Robert explained to his brother that they had arrived at a critical moment in the movement, as
blacks in the North were antagonistic, and coupled with the fact that the leaders of the various
civil rights organizations were all competing with each other instead of creating a united front,
the situation had the potential to get out of control on a broad scale.
The most compelling factor in RFK‘s advice that stood out to the group was the
suggestion that King had lost his stranglehold of influence over the black populace. The gospel
of nonviolence had begun to lose its effectiveness, and for the Kennedy administration, that
meant the loss of a containable approach to civil rights. The Gandhian tactics of nonviolence had
played a pivotal role in the civil rights protests of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and although
they had frustrated the Kennedys for their insistence in pushing forth the agenda of black
equality, they had accepted it because they knew that they could, to a certain extent, control it.
Nonviolent resistance afforded the administration the freedom to manipulate and work the back
channels of the political machinery in the South in order to attain acceptable results that would
not be detrimental to the overall agenda of the White House. The advent of black radicalism and
the threat of violence, however, added a variable to the equation of civil rights protests which the
Kennedys realized they would have no control over. Their pragmatism would be futile in the face
of widespread rioting and bloodshed, placing them in the exact position in which they were most
uncomfortable. The threat of hostile action within the black community forced the hand of the
administration to create legislation in order to placate the growing threat of violence.
201
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Heeding the advice of his younger sibling, JFK made the tentative decision during the
meeting on May 20 to go forward with the creation of a new civil rights bill. Although he had
been hesitant to do so, fearing that the introduction of civil rights legislation would hinder his
ability to run a successful reelection campaign without losing the support of southern Democrats,
the president recognized that the argument being put forth by RFK of growing hostility that
threatened to escalate necessitated action on his part. Burke Marshall would recall that, ―[RFK]
thought it was not just the future of the presidency, but the future of the country that was at stake,
and so, he urged the President very strongly to go ahead with the bill.‖202 During the meeting,
Robert suggested that legislation which would address public accommodations and school
desegregation would be a good option for the president to take, saying, ―If we can get those bills
by, it would be damn helpful. Good for the Negroes, relax this thing.‖203
In the wake of the events in Birmingham, the strategy of reacting to individual crises had
lost its effectiveness. The natural solution, from the standpoint of the executive branch, was to
create the legislation that King and other activists had long been calling for. The timing of the
violence in Birmingham, and the media coverage of it, presented the administration with the
perfect opportunity to take this course of action. The situation in the North and the willingness to
react with aggression by blacks in the South demonstrated the need for a broader resolution that
would effectively address the problem of racial inequality. Robert Kennedy would later reflect
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that the administration had two ways of dealing with the racial crisis, ―Either to protect people,
or to deal with the substantive problem that caused these difficulties. We didn‘t feel that the
protection of people was feasible or acceptable under our constitutional system…what was
acceptable was to get to the heart of the problem.‖204
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CHAPTER 6
THE MEETING: THE GULF IS WIDE

Baldwin and The Fire Next Time

With the expectation that he would come away with a better understanding of the
developing racial crisis amongst blacks in northern cities, Robert Kennedy arranged to meet with
James Baldwin at the attorney general‘s home in McLean, Virginia in late May, 1963. Baldwin‘s
work, Letter from a Region in My Mind, had been published in The New Yorker, and had
received high accolades from the black and white community alike. In the essay, Baldwin gave
an honest assessment of the social realities which blacks were subjected to from birth. He wrote:
One did not have to be very bright to realize how little one could do to change one‘s
situation; one did not have to be abnormally sensitive to be worn down to a cutting edge
by the incessant and gratuitous humiliation and danger one encountered every working
day, all day long…Negroes in this country are taught really to despise themselves from
the moment their eyes open to this world. This world is white and they are black. White
people hold the power, which mean they are superior to blacks, and the world has
innumerable ways of making this difference known and felt and feared. Long before the
Negro child perceives this difference, and even before he understands it, he has begun to
react to it, he has begun to be controlled by it.205

Having read Letter from a Region, Kennedy was moved by the bluntness in which Baldwin
described the plight of poor blacks and the dismal level of expectations placed on them as they
grew up in urban communities. In 1961, JFK had appointed Robert to head the Presidents
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.206 During his exploratory studies of the causes of juvenile
delinquency, RFK had come across the issue of urban poverty and its effects on the racial crisis.
In the month after Birmingham, he sent a memorandum to the president in which he wrote, ―in
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northern slums, the basic problems of jobs, training, and housing may take more than a
generation to resolve.‖ Echoing the writings of Baldwin, Robert thought that the futility that had
become so prevalent in urban black communities had its origins in the disparity that was
burdened upon black children. He made the suggestion to his brother that the Kennedy
administration make a more concerted effort to restore the faith of black youths in the federal
government.207
RFK continued to be troubled by the possibility that the events in Birmingham provoking
black rage might quickly spread to northern cities. The country was not yet aware of the
legislation that the Kennedy administration was preparing, and the threat of violence continued
to linger over black communities in the North and South. He was intent on exploring possible
avenues in which the federal government could reach out to these people and create solutions
that would address the root problems within the ghettos. The initiation of the meeting continued
to demonstrate the lasting effect that Birmingham had left on the attorney general, that of a
personal recognition that the policy of mediation and reaction could not properly combat the
growing militancy that was evident throughout the country.
Burke Marshall arranged the meeting between RFK and the novelist at Kennedy‘s home
at Hickory Hill. As they sat and had breakfast, Baldwin spoke of the burden and inequalities
facing blacks in cities throughout the North. Kennedy, always looking for pragmatic solutions,
asked him what could be done to alleviate those problems. As Marshall later recalled, ―Baldwin
hadn‘t the foggiest idea.‖208 Robert suggested that Baldwin gather a group of northern black
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intellectuals to meet with him in New York City, a setting that would allow them to seek
substantive answers.
On May 24, RFK met with an eclectic group of whites and blacks that had been hastily
brought together by Baldwin with the expectation of facilitating a discussion on the developing
crisis in the northern urban areas and the growing popularity of the Black Muslims.209 Expecting
a group of leading activists and intellectuals from the black community, Kennedy and Marshall
were instead met by a group which included Baldwin, his brother David, singer Lena Horne,
activist Harry Belafonte, African-American playwright Lorraine Hansberry, Dr. Kenneth Clark,
Edwin C. Berry, white actor Rip Torn, King‘s lawyer Clarence Jones, and a CORE Freedom
Rider named Jerome Smith.210 Baldwin would later say that the diversity of the group was
intentional, as he wanted, ―as wide and even as rowdy a range of opinion as possible.‖211 The
novelist also felt that the purpose of the meeting would be for the group to impress on Kennedy
―the extremity of the racial situation‖ in the North and the ―anger of quickening urgency, of
deepening alienation‖ felt by the northern blacks.212
The meeting lasted two and a half hours, and although it had been originally envisioned
by the attorney general to be an informative and intellectual discussion on the issue of race
relations, it quickly digressed into an attack by those in attendance criticizing the civil rights
policies of the White House. Kennedy began by cautioning the group about the extremism of
Black Muslims, at which point he was interrupted by Jerome Smith. Smith told the attorney
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general, ―You don‘t have no idea what trouble is…when I pull the trigger, kiss it goodbye.‖213
Smith was referring to the idea that the real problem that whites would have to deal with was not
the Black Muslim, but the African-American youth who had seen the kind of brutal treatment by
southern whites that he himself had witnessed during his time as a Freedom Rider. Smith had
been severely beaten in McComb, Mississippi by a white mob in 1961, and had experienced
similar violence on several other occasions. The young Freedom Rider had been such an
advocate of nonviolent resistance, that he had been nicknamed ‗Gandhi Two‘ by his fellow
activists.214 He was frustrated and jaded by the Kennedy administration‘s unwillingness to create
civil rights legislation. Baldwin later commented that ―[Smith] set the tone of the meeting
because he stammers when he‘s upset. He stammered when he talked to Bobby…and Bobby
took it personally.‖215 To RFK‘s surprise, Smith told the attorney general that being in the same
room as him made him want to vomit.216
After an awkward pause, Kennedy tried to steer the conversation back to the events of
Birmingham and Mississippi, or as Baldwin would later call it, ―the same old stuff.‖217 However,
Lorraine Hansberry interjected by saying, ―Mr. Kennedy, he [Smith] is the voice of 20 million
Americans and he is the most important man in this room.‖218 Baldwin recalled that after
Hansberry‘s comment, the group began to become agitated about RFK‘s apparent lack of
sympathy and comprehension, saying, ―It got worse. Bobby didn‘t understand what we were
trying to tell him; he didn‘t understand our urgency. For him it was a political matter…but what
213
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was wrong [was] something very sinister, very deep, that couldn‘t be solved in the usual way.‖219
Sensing an opportunity to create further discussion and antagonize Kennedy, Baldwin asked
Smith if he would ever fight for the United States in a war against Cuba. Smith responded,
―Never! Never! Never!‖220 Kennedy was outraged that any citizen would refuse to defend his
country, and pointed out to the group that his Irish grandparents had been immigrants and had
overcome similar prejudices. Baldwin retorted that his own family had been in the same country
for longer than three generations and yet were still stuck at the bottom of the social sphere.221
Following this remark, Kennedy tried to salvage the meeting by praising the work of the Justice
Department lawyers in black voting rights cases. The group responded with laughter, a laughter
that Clark commented was, ―the laughter of desperation.‖222
After two hours the final comment came from Lorraine Hansberry, who praised black
men and the role they had played in the movement, and concluded by saying, ―Mr. Attorney
General, I am very worried about the state of a civilization which produces that white cop
standing on that Negro woman‘s neck in Birmingham.‖223 Hansberry then stood up, thanked
Kennedy for listening, and left the room. The rest of the group followed her lead and walked out
of the apartment, leaving Kennedy to reflect on the frustration he felt by the experience. He
would later observe that those who attended the meeting:
Started sort of competing with each other in attacking us, the President, the federal
government…People got madder and madder when they thought about the treatment of
Negroes…The way to show that they hadn‘t forgotten where they came from was to
219
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berate me and berate the United States government that had made this position a
condition…They didn‘t really know, with a few exceptions, any of the facts.‖224
Baldwin‘s own view on the meeting mirrored that of the attorney general, though for him it was
RFK who did not fully understand the facts. Following the meeting, the novelist was quoted in
the New York Times saying that Kennedy did not ―understand the full extent of the growing
racial strife in the North.‖225 He also told Newsweek that there was a ―gulf‖ that divided Harlem
and McLean, saying, ―He [Kennedy] just didn‘t get the point. He was naïve, he doesn‘t know
pain. He just doesn‘t know.‖226

****
A critical transition in the outlook of Robert Kennedy towards civil rights took place in
the weeks following the Baldwin meeting. Journalist Jack Newfield observed that Robert ―forged
his consciousness out of what he saw and felt…they helped him invent himself through personal
engagement…his emotions made him open and vulnerable to the immediate moment.‖227 The
discussion between the attorney general and the Baldwin group signified the first time in which
Kennedy had been confronted by a group of African-Americans who were willing to bluntly
portray the despair and dissatisfaction that they felt over their social standing and the policies of
his brother‘s administration. Until that point, the Kennedy administration had advocated a civil
rights policy that dealt with problems on a case by case basis. If a crisis regarding race relations
or segregation arose, they would take appropriate legal action to temper that particular situation.
Victor Navasky writes that this strategy was calculated:
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As each crisis surfaced, the [Attorney] General confidently approached it on the
assumption that it was a temporary eruption which he and his remarkable team could
cool…The trick was to encourage the inevitable integration but never at the cost of
disturbing the social equilibrium. His most visible and most significant civil rights
activities were responsive, reactive, crisis-managing, violence-avoiding.228
The problem facing RFK, was that throughout each of these crises in the Deep South there had
never been a sense of urgency or willingness on the part of the federal government to rectify the
root problem of racial inequality. There was rarely an effort made to look past the crisis at hand
and delve into the overlying social factors that spawned the event. What the Kennedys failed to
understand was that the importance placed by civil rights activists on the need for executive
legislative action was deliberate. In contrast to the Kennedy strategy of voter registration, these
activists understood that more than anything legislation would address the foundations of racial
injustice first and foremost, and in doing so mandate social change.
The Baldwin meeting made it clear to the attorney general that there existed a great sense
of exigency from within the black populace that was not satisfied by the token gains of political
maneuvering. It also demonstrated that the time frame for which the Kennedy administration had
to act was diminishing with each failed opportunity to enact legislation. Going into the meeting,
RFK thought that the work of the Justice Department had been enough to keep all sides content
with what progress had been made. A significant moment for Robert Kennedy came when
Jerome Smith told him that being in the same room as the attorney general made him physically
ill. Smith had been on the roster of the original CORE Freedom Rides, had participated in the
second leg of those rides, and was a well respected member of CORE‘s New Orleans branch. He
had advocated the path of nonviolent resistance, and had been brutally beaten during the second
round of Freedom Rides in the fall of 1961 by Ku Klux Klansmen. In essence, Smith was the
228

Navasky, Kennedy Justice, 97.

95

model activist who Kennedy had worked so diligently to protect the legal rights of during his
first years in the Justice Department. He was not an agitator who willingly preached the new
gospel of violence that was so readily gaining a foothold within the black community. Yet he sat
face to face with the attorney general and told him bluntly that even for one as qualified and well
versed in the tactics of peaceful resistance, time had run out. The pragmatic approach of the
Kennedys could no longer coexist with the needs of the black community. The promises of the
administration meant nothing unless they were backed by substantive action.
The participants in the meeting interpreted RFK‘s silence to Smith‘s anger as being one
in which the attorney general lacked understanding of the underlying meanings within the
Freedom Riders words. Dr. Clark recounted, ―We were shocked that he was shocked and that he
seemed unable to understand what Smith was trying to say.‖229 To the contrary, RFK understood
every word that was being spoken to him, however he was not prepared to hear such a straight
forward assessment of the failures of his department. Kennedy aide Nicholas Katzenbach
commented, ―After Baldwin, he was absolutely shocked. Bobby expected to be made an
honorary black. It really hurt his feelings, and it was pretty mean. But the fact that he thought he
knew so much –and learned he didn‘t- was important.‖230 Kennedy recognized that for all of the
progress that the administration thought they had accomplished in quelling civil rights crisis‘s, in
the eyes of the average black person that had faced the brutality, degradation and hopelessness
on a daily basis, the federal government‘s actions were nothing more than symbolic gestures.
Historian William Chafe writes that in the wake of southern civil rights conflicts, most blacks
became conscious of the fact that ―despite their sacrifice, most of the underlying problems
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remained, largely because those in power felt no compulsion to alter established patterns once
token concessions had been made.‖231 For all of his work in resolving civil rights clashes in the
South, Robert Kennedy was finding that his own actions had little to do with finding solutions
that would address the very foundations of black inequality and effectively create lasting change.
The attorney general was beginning to grasp the depth of black anger that was evident
throughout the country. It was during this time, Evan Thomas writes, that ―RFK made the leap
from contempt to identification.‖ A few days after the Baldwin confrontation, he told Ed
Guthman that ‗if he had grown up a Negro, he would feel as strongly as the Baldwin group.‘232
He had come to the meeting with expectations of finding pragmatic answers, and instead came
away with the reality that his efforts, and for that matter the efforts of his brother‘s
administration, had simply not been enough.
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CHAPTER 7
THE SHIFT: THE NEW APPROACH TO FEDERAL INTERVENTION

Federal Employment and the Catalyst

Although he was aggravated with the course that the meeting had taken, Robert Kennedy
was able to channel that anger into recognition of the state of frustration that blacks felt. As
friend Jack Newfield would observe, ―[Robert‘s] emotions made him open and vulnerable to the
immediate moment. Kennedy was at his best whenever he suspended his reason and trusted his
instincts.‖233 Robert‘s personality afforded him the opportunity to learn from moments in which
he was able to bear witness to human suffering and pain. Author Peter Maas echoed this
assessment, saying, ―Bob didn‘t change except through experience.‖234 While John was a
consummate and controlled politician, Robert exuded emotion, a trait that left him vulnerable to
personal experience. President Kennedy, for example, became conscious of the horrors of
poverty by reading Michael Harrington‘s The Other America.235 RFK came to that same
understanding only after touring ghettos and meeting children and families who were starving
and burdened by their social condition. Newfield writes that ―For Robert Kennedy, the sight of
one hungry black child had a greater impact than a million words or statistics.‖236 A similar
experience presented itself during the Baldwin meeting. Standing face to face with Jerome
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Smith, listening to the pain and desperation in the Freedom Rider‘s voice, Robert began to make
the connection between the despair of African-Americans and the lack of substantive action on
the part of the federal government. Baldwin would later comment that ―[Smith] became the focal
point. I think that threw Kennedy. That boy, after all, in some sense, represented to everybody in
that room our hope. Our honor. Our dignity. But, above all, our hope.‖237
The Baldwin meeting provided the perfect forum for which RFK‘s emotions could
supersede any calculated political thought. He was fueled by emotion and experience, and the
gathering in New York allowed him the chance to examine his own understanding of civil rights
and the human element of black suffering that he had at times overlooked during the first years
of his brother‘s presidency. Evan Thomas writes that the attorney general was able to transform
―his rage into outrage.‖238 He took the anger he felt as a result of the meeting and began to focus
on the federal government‘s token policy of hiring African-Americans.
Five days after the meeting, Robert stormed into a meeting of the Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity, which was chaired by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. He had just
read a report that analyzed minority employment of federal employees in Birmingham. Out of a
possible two thousand jobs, only fifteen of them were held by African-Americans. The figure
represented one percent of federal employees in a city whose black population consisted of
thirty-seven percent of the overall population. RFK was infuriated by the report, and became
livid when Burke Marshal, who had just returned from the city, told him ―I‘d gone into every
federal office…and you couldn‘t even find a Negro sweeping the floor.‖ The attorney general
openly berated Johnson, challenging his committee‘s reports that showed hundred percent
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improvements in minority workforces, calling them ―phony statistics.‖239 Kennedy demanded
that the federal government begin reanalyzing their minority hiring practices.
What the Baldwin meeting demonstrated to RFK was that the level of animosity within
the black community was not a regional problem, but one that was endemic to every part of the
country, and one that penetrated all classes of African-Americans. The reality of the problem of
black equality, and the sluggishness for which the Kennedy administration had taken in dealing
with legislation was creating an even greater sense of frustration from an expectant and hopeful
black community that was reaching their breaking point. Two weeks after the Baldwin meeting,
the Afro-American wrote:
Baldwin and Co. are correct in their conclusion that the Kennedys had not accurately
judged the intensity of feeling about discrimination among our people or their burning
determination to be free…Now they know we are sick of gradualism, of the denial of
human dignity, of segregation, of second-class citizenship and that we fully intend to do
something about it in both the North and the South.240
The change in Robert Kennedy‘s rhetoric was apparent in his speeches and meetings in
the weeks following the Baldwin meeting. On a flight to North Carolina just days after the
encounter, RFK mentioned to Burke Marshall that the time had come to create true civil rights
legislation that would go further than any of its predecessors by getting to the ―heart of the
matter‖ and killing Jim Crow segregation. 241 In his commencement address at Trinity College on
June 2, Kennedy reflected on the moral crisis that faced the nation when he told the audience,
―The current crisis in civil rights for example…is an intensely human problem…Our answer to
the extremists must be to move quickly in establishing those reforms which all of us know in our
239
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hearts, should have been made long ago.‖242 That same week, the attorney general met with a
delegation of Democratic senators and told them bluntly:
The nation is in the midst of a civil rights crisis not only in the South but in the North.
This is a terribly dangerous situation. These people are looking to the Federal government
for the protection of their rights and often there is nothing we can do until we must send
in troops to preserve order…We will need new legislation.243

The final decision to go forth with civil rights legislation was finalized by the president
following a meeting on June 1 in the Oval Office with his closest advisers, which included RFK,
Burke Marshall, JFK, Ted Sorensen, and Lyndon B. Johnson.244 Kennedy presented the question
to the group, ―What‘s going to be the result if we don‘t have any further legislation?‖ To which
Marshall cut in, ―I don‘t think we really have an alternative. You couldn‘t go on and not have
legislation…it‘s absolutely essential that you have legislation.‖ Historian Nick Bryant writes,
―By the end of the meeting, Kennedy had crossed the Rubicon. He knew that further
equivocation could engender further violence.‖245 The Kennedy administration had finally
committed itself to civil rights legislation, and now needed to find an appropriate opportunity
that would allow them to enact such a bold initiative.
Robert Kennedy was aware that in order for his brother to propose a comprehensive civil
rights bill, he would need a catalyst that would ease the acceptance and willingness to pass such
legislation in both Congress and in the minds of the populace. The images of Bull Connor‘s
brutality towards the children in Birmingham had shocked and horrified the nation, and the
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Kennedys knew that they would need a symbol which would confirm the moral clarity that had
been left in the wake of the fire hoses and police dogs. The catalyst they were looking for
presented itself in the form of Alabama Governor George Wallace‘s public declaration to bar all
black students from enrolling at the University of Alabama.246
Upon his election to the governorship, Wallace had defiantly proclaimed that he would
ensure that segregation would continue in the South. He was given the opportunity to back up his
words when two black students, Vivian Malone and James Hood, gained admission to the
University of Alabama. Disregarding a federal court order that banned interference by state
officials, Wallace vowed to block the entrance to the registrar‘s office.247 Robert Kennedy had
been preparing for Wallace‘s defiance for months in advance. Earlier that year, he had personally
gone to Alabama and met with the governor. However, the meeting had been a total failure, as
Wallace openly recorded the conversation between the two men in hopes of tricking the attorney
general into saying something disparaging about the Alabama state government.248
Hoping to avoid a similar situation of bloodshed that had been seen in Oxford, the White
House took the initiative by negotiating with local Alabama entrepreneurs who had business
connections with the governor, and who had no intention of having mob violence run rampant in
their streets. By choosing to attack his business connections, the Kennedys hoped to put enough
economic pressure on Wallace to force him to abandon his proposed public defiance.249 In order
to ensure that state troops could not be used by the governor, JFK federalized the Alabama
National Guard. It was exactly the kind of situation both the Kennedy brothers were comfortable
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with. They had strategically positioned themselves to be in control of the crisis before it had
reached a breaking point, and in doing so had provided the perfect opportunity to introduce the
country to the idea of civil rights legislation.
―I don‘t think you can get by without it‖

The night before Vivian Malone and James Hood were to enroll in the university, Robert
discussed the subject of enacting the civil rights bill at a White House meeting, and advised his
brother to go on national television and speak to the people about what that legislation would
entail. When asked by several advisers whether he was willing to appear before the nation and
speak on an issue that was so decisive, President Kennedy responded, ―I don‘t think so...‖ to
which his brother interjected, ―I think it would be helpful…I don't think you can get by now
without saying-- having an address on television, at least during this period of time, giving some
direction and having it in the hands of the President.‖250 RFK would later recall, ―We were going
to send up the legislation, and he [JFK] could talk about what we needed to accomplish…I think
he pretty much made up his mind, after that conference, that he would speak.‖251
President Kennedy rarely dealt firsthand with the problems of civil rights, relying instead
on the judgment of his brother and his advisers. More than any other, though, JFK trusted first
and foremost the opinion of his brother. Ignoring the advice to forego a television address by his
closest aides, which included Ted Sorensen and Kenneth O‘Donnell, the president decided that
he would speak to the nation and capitalize on Wallace‘s overt defiance. The lone voice of
support came from the attorney general. Robert Kennedy understood more than any other
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member of the president‘s inner circle that if civil rights legislation was going to be able to make
a significant impact, it would have to be unilaterally accepted by both the United States Congress
as well as the general public. Garnering enough support within Congress would require savvy
political maneuvering on the part of the administration; however the public‘s willingness to
accept proposed legislation would require a deeper moralistic appeal to the social consciousness
of the populace. Anything less than dual support from the government and the public would
subject the civil rights bill to a similar fate of previous legislation, in which watered down
legislation resulted in little more than token gains. For this reason, the attorney general was
steadfast in his belief that it was necessary for his brother to not only speak to the country about
the proposals he wanted to make for black civil rights, but to do so with rhetoric that would make
an appeal to the moral consciousness of the country. RFK‘s suggestion was enough for the
president to recognize that it was the right choice to make. As Marshall would later reflect:
When President Kennedy sent up that [civil rights] bill every single person who spoke
about it in the White House—every one of them—was against President Kennedy
sending up that bill; against his speech in June; against making it a moral issue…The
conclusive voice within the government at that time, there‘s no question about it at all,
that Robert Kennedy was the one. He urged it, he felt it, he understood it. And he
prevailed. I don‘t think there was anybody in the Cabinet—except the President
himself—who felt that way on these issues, and the President got it from his brother.252

The first draft of the civil rights legislation speech, written by Ted Sorensen, reflected the ideas
and concerns that RFK had been stressing to his brother. Although discarded for the final speech,
a section of the initial draft focused squarely on the de facto segregation that was so prevalent in
northern cities, saying, ―Let no white Northerner delude himself for an instant with the notion
that racial discrimination is chiefly a matter for Southern concern…the Northern Negro…must,
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like his Southern brother, breathe the stifling air of oppression every day of his life.‖253 The draft
portrayed the state of ghettoes in which black tenants paid exorbitant rents, faced employment
discrimination, and were forced to send their children to overcrowded and understaffed schools
in which black youths were more likely to drop out and join their parents in the ―seemingly
endless treadmill of poverty and neglect and despair.‖254 The section that discussed the plight of
northern blacks would be removed from the final draft of the speech in favor of a more universal
approach to referencing de facto segregation, in which the president said, ―This is not a sectional
issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in every city, in every State of the
Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that threatens the public safety.‖255
However, it is worth noting that the initial draft of the most important civil rights speech given
during the Kennedy presidency mirrored the views and observations of Robert Kennedy,
demonstrating the importance and weight of the attorney general‘s role as the administrations
civil rights point man at such a critical juncture.
The following day, with four hundred Army troops on alert at nearby Fort Benning,
Justice Department officials carrying a cease and desist order from the president, and a
federalized National Guardsmen escort, Malone and Hood arrived on the Tuscaloosa campus.
Facing this overwhelming show of federal force, Wallace could do nothing more than read a
defiant statement against integration and then step aside to allow both students to register.256
That night, after watching a tape of Wallace‘s declaration, the President heeded his brother‘s
advice and went on national television to speak to the country about the state of racial inequality
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that existed, and the urgent need to rectify a ―moral crisis‖. In the speech, half of which was done
extemporaneously, JFK discussed the social contradiction that existed, saying:
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it. And we cherish our freedom here
at home. But are we to say to the world- and much more importantly to each other- that
this is the land of the free, except for the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens,
except Negroes; that we have no class or caste ghettos, no master race, except with
respect to Negroes. Now the time has come for this nation to fulfill its promise. 257
The president evoked the principles in which the country had been established, saying, ―This
Nation was founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principle
that all men are created equal, and that the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of
one man are threatened.‖ Based on this idea alone, he continued, ―It ought to be possible, in
short, for every American to enjoy the privileges of being American without regard to his race or
his color. In short, every American ought to have the right to be treated as he would wish to be
treated.‖ 258 JFK concluded his address by commenting on the demonstrations that had been so
prevalent during his presidency, saying, ―We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you
can't have that right…that the only way that they are going to get their rights is to go into the
streets and demonstrate. I think we owe them and we owe ourselves a better country than
that.‖259
John F. Kennedy proclaimed that the country faced a ―moral crisis‖ that could no longer
be ignored or kept at bay. In doing so, the president altered the course of federal intervention in
the civil rights movement. For the first time since the implementation of segregation, the
executive branch was able to firmly offer the black community the moral leadership that they
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desired. The response to the speech by the black media and the black community throughout the
nation was one of admiration and relief. The Afro-American proclaimed, ―Kennedy‘s
impassioned plea for Congressional action to insure freedom and racial justice was
unquestionably the greatest speech ever made by a Chief Executive. Profound, eloquent and
moving.‖260
For those who had been in attendance at the Baldwin meeting, there was a sense of
satisfaction in the wake of the president‘s address. To these participants, the urgency that they
had hoped to portray to Robert F. Kennedy was reflected in the words of JFK‘s speech. It proved
to them that while on the surface RFK seemed to barely comprehend their grievances, in fact the
attorney general had come away from the meeting with an emerging awareness that was clearly
reflected in the president‘s rhetoric. Dr. Kenneth Clark would later observe, ―We left convinced
that we had made no dent or impact on Bobby…but then Jack Kennedy gave that famous civil
rights speech, which contained many of the same ideas. So our conclusion that we had made no
dent at all was wrong.‖261
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The Baldwin meeting played an integral role in the evolution of Robert F. Kennedy‘s
understanding of the civil rights movement, and concordantly altered the Kennedy
administrations approach to civil rights. As the point man for the administration‘s civil rights
policy, the onus fell upon the attorney general to incorporate the heightened expectations of the
black community that had been created during the campaign of 1960 and blend them with the
responsibilities of his own office. Throughout the initial years of the presidency this proved to be
a difficult task, one in which RFK consistently found himself towing the line between his own
moral sense and the obligation he had to ensure that the laws of the land were upheld. It was a
complex conundrum, one that was seemingly amplified by his failure to comprehend and relate
to the frustration and urgency that was consistently demonstrated by black activists.
The Baldwin meeting therefore acted as a catalyst of change in which RFK was able to
witness firsthand the resentment and raw emotion that he had yet to see directly from AfricanAmericans. Until that point, the crises that had preceded the meeting had all been handled from
afar, with the administration coordinating and implementing their strategy from the detached
environment of Washington D.C. Throughout the Kennedy presidency, the administration
consistently avoided direct confrontations with civil rights organizations. When meetings did
take place between the Kennedys and civil rights leaders, they were defined by formalities and
cautiously proposed ideas. Black activists were weary of the potential power and influence with
which the president and his brother held through their political office, and thus were reluctant to
push the White House out of fear that they may alienate them from their cause. The Baldwin
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meeting provided the first forum in which black activists were able to bluntly portray their
frustration and desperation face to face with a high ranking member of the administration. It was
a message that reflected the growing animosity and urgency within the African-American
community, and it was delivered in an unabashed way. For Robert Kennedy it was precisely the
type of approach that was necessary in order to elicit change, a personal attack fueled by passion.
The events leading up to the Baldwin meeting in 1963 demonstrated that the Kennedy
brothers, as a result of their upbringing and social status, were completely unprepared to step into
a leadership role that would further the cause of black equality. Both John and Robert Kennedy
had been raised in a world whose social sphere was separate from that of African-Americans.
Through savvy political maneuvering, the brothers had been able to incorporate the issue of civil
rights and adapt them for their own purposes. The rhetoric of the 1960 campaign stressing the
need for moral leadership, coupled with the promise of racial equality had been enough to win
the black vote. However, during the initial years of the presidency the exigency that was
consistently demonstrated within the black community for immediate change was a concept that
was too unfamiliar to the Kennedy brothers to be dealt with properly. They had neither the
understanding of black inequality nor the unjust system of segregation that would allow them to
effect positive and permanent change. Instead they chose to react rather than act, allowing
activists and demonstrators to dictate the administration‘s civil rights policy.
The confrontation between Robert F. Kennedy and the Baldwin participants marked the
beginning of a transition that would alter the attorney general‘s mindset towards civil rights.
Activist John Lewis would later write about Robert Kennedy, ―the man who had been reviled by
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so many of us, including me, for his foot dragging...I came to respect enormously… he was
willing to listen, and learn, and change.‖262 Harry Belafonte would mirror this sentiment:
In the process of these appeals we found in him an awakening to so many things that he
had misunderstood and dismissed. It bothered him that he sat in such a position of
enormous ignorance on the subject. Much to his credit his curiosity peaked more
intensely to see what we were talking about and wanted him to do and that became his
moral center…He listened, and as he listened the more and more he committed himself to
our cause.263

RFK had seen firsthand the enmity that existed throughout the country within African-American
communities. The impact of the Baldwin meeting was a definitive moment in which the realities
of the state of the civil rights struggle became a part of his own political outlook, and helped play
an integral factor in swaying his brother to take an active role in the creation of legislation. The
legacy of inaction from the first three years of the Kennedy presidency came to an end as a result
of the final decision by the president and his brother to create federal civil rights legislation.
The personal barriers defined by moralistic idealism and the desire to protect his brother
and the public image of the presidency began to erode as RFK became exposed to the social
reality of blacks living in the United States. The inability to comprehend the deeper issues that
lay at the foundation of the system of segregation, clearly demonstrated by the mishandling of
civil rights crises throughout the initial years of the Kennedy presidency, began to evolve into a
greater understanding of black suffering that would help shape the federal government‘s
approach to civil rights in the ensuing years.
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Good evening, my fellow citizens,
This afternoon, following a series of threats and defiant statements, the presence of
Alabama National Guardsmen was required on the University of Alabama to carry out the final
and unequivocal order of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Alabama.
That order called for the admission of two clearly qualified young Alabama residents who
happened to have been born Negro.
That they were admitted peacefully on the campus is due in good measure to the conduct
of the students of the University of Alabama, who met their responsibilities in a constructive
way.
I hope that every American, regardless of where he lives, will stop and examine his
conscience about this and other related incidents. This Nation was founded by men of many
nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that
the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened.
Today we are committed to a worldwide struggle to promote and protect the rights of all
who wish to be free. And when Americans are sent to Viet-Nam or West Berlin, we do not ask
for whites only. It ought to be possible, therefore, for American students of any color to attend
any public institution they select without having to be backed up by troops.
It ought to be possible for American consumers of any color to receive equal service in
places of public accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and retail stores,
without being forced to resort to demonstrations in the street, and it ought to be possible for
American citizens of any color to register and to vote in a free election without interference or
fear of reprisal.
It ought to be possible, in short, for every American to enjoy the privileges of being
American without regard to his race or his color. In short, every American ought to have the
right to be treated as he would wish to be treated, as one would wish his children to be treated.
But this is not the case.
The Negro baby born in America today, regardless of the section of the Nation in which
he is born, has about one-half as much chance of completing a high school as a white baby born
in the same place on the same day, one-third as much chance of completing college, one-third as
much chance of becoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becoming unemployed,
about one-seventh as much chance of earning $10,000 a year, a life expectancy which is 7 years
shorter, and the prospects of earning only half as much.
This is not a sectional issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in
every city, in every State of the Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that
threatens the public safety. Nor is this a partisan issue. In a time of domestic crisis men of good
will and generosity should be able to unite regardless of party or politics. This is not even a legal
or legislative issue alone. It is better to settle these matters in the courts than on the streets, and
new laws are needed at every level, but law alone cannot make men see right.
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as
clear as the American Constitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and
equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated.
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he
cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the public
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officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us
want, then who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his
place? Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay?
One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet
their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice.
They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation, for all its hopes
and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its citizens are free.
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it, and we cherish our freedom here
at home, but are we to say to the world, and much more importantly, to each other that this is a
land of the free except for the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens except Negroes;
that we have no class or cast system, no ghettos, no master race except with respect to Negroes?
Now the time has come for this Nation to fulfill its promise. The events in Birmingham
and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can
prudently choose to ignore them.
The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, North and South, where
legal remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades, and
protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.
We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be
quieted by token moves or talk. It is a time to act in the Congress, in your State and local
legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives.
It is not enough to pin the blame on others, to say this is a problem of one section of the
country or another, or deplore the fact that we face. A great change is at hand, and our task, our
obligation, is to make that revolution, that change, peaceful and constructive for all.
Those who do nothing are inviting shame as well as violence. Those who act boldly are
recognizing right as well as reality.
Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it
has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or
law. The Federal judiciary has upheld that proposition in a series of forthright cases. The
executive branch has adopted that proposition in the conduct of its affairs, including the
employment of Federal personnel, the use of Federal facilities, and the sale of federally financed
housing.
But there are other necessary measures which only the Congress can provide, and they
must be provided at this session. The old code of equity law, under which we live commands for
every wrong a remedy, but in too many communities, in too many parts of the country, wrongs
are inflicted on Negro citizens and there are no remedies at law. Unless the Congress acts, their
only remedy is in the street.
I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all Americans the right to
be served in facilities which are open to the public - hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and
similar establishments.
This seems to me to be an elementary right. Its denial is an arbitrary indignity that no
American in 1963 should have to endure, but many do.
I have recently met with scores of business leaders urging them to take voluntary action
to end this discrimination and I have been encouraged by their response, and in the last 2 weeks
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over 75 cities have seen progress made in desegregating these kinds of facilities. But many are
unwilling to act alone, and for this reason, nationwide legislation is needed if we are to move this
problem from the streets to the courts.
I am also asking Congress to authorize the Federal Government to participate more fully
in lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education. We have succeeded in persuading
many districts to desegregate voluntarily. Dozens have admitted Negroes without violence.
Today a Negro is attending a State-supported institution in every one of our 50 States, but the
pace is very slow.
Too many Negro children entering segregated grade schools at the time of the Supreme
Court's decision 9 years ago will enter segregated high schools this fall, having suffered a loss
which can never be restored. The lack of an adequate education denies the Negro a chance to get
a decent job.
The orderly implementation of the Supreme Court decision, therefore, cannot be left
solely to those who may not have the economic resources to carry the legal action or who may be
subject to harassment.
Other features will be also requested, including greater protection for the right to vote.
But legislation, I repeat, cannot solve this problem alone. It must be solved in the homes of every
American in every community across our country.
In this respect, I want to pay tribute to those citizens North and South who have been
working in their communities to make life better for all. They are acting not out of a sense of
legal duty but out of a sense of human decency.
Like our soldiers and sailors in all parts of the world they are meeting freedom's
challenge on the firing line, and I salute them for their honor and their courage.
My fellow Americans, this is a problem which faces us all - in every city of the North as
well as the South. Today there are Negroes unemployed, two or three times as many compared to
whites, inadequate in education, moving into the large cities, unable to find work, young people
particularly out of work without hope, denied equal rights, denied the opportunity to eat at a
restaurant or lunch counter or go to a movie theater, denied the right to a decent education,
denied almost today the right to attend a State university even though qualified. It seems to me
that these are matters which concern us all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or Governors,
but every citizen of the United States.
This is one country. It has become one country because all of us and all the people who
came here had an equal chance to develop their talents.
We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you can't have that right; that your
children can't have the chance to develop whatever talents they have; that the only way that they
are going to get their rights is to go into the streets and demonstrate. I think we owe them and we
owe ourselves a better country than that.
Therefore, I am asking for your help in making it easier for us to move ahead and to
provide the kind of equality of treatment which we would want ourselves; to give a chance for
every child to be educated to the limit of his talents.
As I have said before, not every child has an equal talent or an equal ability or an equal
motivation, but they should have the equal right to develop their talent and their ability and their
motivation, to make something of themselves.
We have a right to expect that the Negro community will be responsible, will uphold the
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law, but they have a right to expect that the law will be fair, that the Constitution will be color
blind, as Justice Harlan said at the turn of the century.
This is what we are talking about and this is a matter which concerns this country and
what it stands for, and in meeting it I ask the support of all our citizens.264
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And what about this age? What about Americans we know now, at a time when the
inadequate phrase ―Civil Rights‖ has come to reflect an urgent nation-wide struggle for equality
by ten and a half percent of our people whose skin is not white?
Clearly, and beyond any possible argument, the Constitution and its Amendments have
set forth the basic particulars of ―Civil Rights.‖ Negroes were freed from slavery under the
Thirteenth Amendment, and granted the right to vote under the Fifteenth.
The time is long past when any sensible American could tolerate the denials of free
voting rights to all races or the existence of ―White Only‖ signs on public facilities—even by the
narrowest interpretation, these things are unconstitutional.
And nine years ago the Supreme Court ruled that the old faulty dictum of ―separate but
equal‖ schooling for Negroes was unconstitutional too.
But we must now wait, as intelligent modern Americans in a changing society; must we
now wait for the Supreme Court to spell out each new particularity of civil rights to us?
Whatever color we are, let us hope not.
Now as always, when the Constitution is too narrowly interpreted on a word-for-word
basis, it can too easily become a crutch for reaction, a rationalization, and excuse for maintaining
the status quo.
This is the very thing that Jefferson feared, so long ago, when he urged us not to regard
the wording of a document with ―sanctimonious reverence.‖
My point is that the Constitution was never meant to specify every detail, every
individual right in the relations of man to man in this country.
It was intended to set forth certain duties of government and certain restrictions on
government—nowhere in its wording does it pretend to tell us, as individual citizens, how to
treat our neighbors.
But what Woodrow Wilson called the spirit of the Constitution does, and has always
done just that. Interspersed throughout the Constitution and its amendments—written in between
the lines, if you will—are the basic moral principles of democratic justice by which we all try to
live.
Surely we don‘t need a new Court decision to tell us that Negro is entitled to decent
housing, and that his right to have such housing must not be denied or abridged because of his
color.
Surely we don‘t need a new Court ruling to insure the Negro equal opportunities in
employment, or equal opportunities to advance from unskilled into skilled and responsible jobs.
These are moral issues, not legal ones, and their constitutionality is a matter of common
sense.
Not in its words alone but in what these words imply, in the underlying truths it
teaches—that is how the Constitution has always served us as an inspiration and a guide.
And today that is how it points the way clearly to what thinking Americans have known
all along: that racial discrimination is not worthy of us; that he stifling air of prejudice is not fit
to be breathed by the people of a nation that takes pride in calling itself fee.
The shameful scenes of riot and bloodshed in Oxford, Mississippi, last Fall, and in
Birmingham, Alabama this Spring, were only symptoms of the trouble—outward manifestations
of an inner disease. And the infection is by no means localized.
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Let no white northerner delude himself that discrimination is chiefly a matter of southern
concern. It may be true that a northern Negro is free to register at a Hilton hotel, but how much
pride or pleasure can he take in this when he can‘t buy three meals a day for his children?
In Detroit, where Negroes account for twenty percent of the population, they account for
sixty percent of the unemployed. In Chicago, one out of every four Negroes with families to
support is out of work. And the same frustrating, demoralizing facts are to be found in the Negro
ghettos of every other northern city.
This is a national crisis, and it is immediate. The federal government is doing and will
continue to do its part. Indeed, in the past two and a half years more progress has been made in
securing equal rights for all Americans—through executive action, legislation, litigation,
persuasion and private initiative—than in any comparable period of our history. Yet a great deal
more needs to be done.
But in questions of public morality, Federal action alone is not enough. In an era of great
social flux and upheaval, it would be idle for anyone to suppose that real enlightenment can be
brought about by governmental edict.
The surface eruptions of an internal disease cannot be cured with bandages. The only way
to cure a disease is to attack it at the source; and the sources of this disease, this malignancy that
has been allowed to grow within the tissue of our national life, are as minute and various as the
cells in any living body.
They are to be found throughout the texture of our society, wherever a meeting takes
place between persons of light and dark skin.
That is where the treatment must begin. There must be active and continued work toward
interracial understanding at all levels—in states, in cities, in individual neighborhoods within
cities, in towns and hamlets and in homes across the length and breadth of this nation.
Leadership must be taken at every level—by clergymen, by educators, by civil
authorities, by newspapers, by businessmen and by labor unions. But above all, I believe that the
moral health of this country depends on individual citizens, white and Negro, who are able to use
their minds, able to see, able to act truthfully in a time of evolutionary change.
For too many years the Negro have been asked to ―be patient,‖ and advised that we must
all ―move slowly in adjusting civil rights to social custom.‖
The day is long gone when those phrases had any validity—if indeed they ever did.265
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The Civil Rights Movement 1910-1968

1910

- Founding of NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People)

1917

- John Fitzgerald Kennedy is born.

1917-1935

- Harlem Renaissance

1923

- Moore vs. Dempsey

1925

- Robert Francis Kennedy is born.

1929

- Martin Luther King, Jr. is born.

1931

- The Scottsboro Case

1942

- Founding of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)

1944

- Smith vs. Allright

1946

- Morgan vs. Virginia

1947

-―Journey of Reconciliation‖, predecessor to the 1961
CORE Freedom Rides
- Jackie Robinson plays for the Brooklyn Dodgers, breaking the
color barrier in Major League Baseball.

1951

- NAACP activist Harry T. Moore is assassinated.

1952

- John F. Kennedy wins election to the Senate.

1954

- Brown v. Board of Education.

1955

- (August) Emmet Till is brutally murdered in Mississippi.
- (December) Montgomery bus boycott led by Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.

1957

- Eisenhower sends troops to Little Rock, Arkansas.
- King helps establish SCLC (Southern Christian
Leadership Conference)

1960

- (February) Greensboro, North Carolina Sit-Ins begin
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- (April) Founding of SNCC (Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee)
- (October) John F. Kennedy phone call to Coretta Scott King.
- (November) John F. Kennedy is elected president.
1961

- (May) CORE Freedom Rides begin in the South.

1962

- (October) Centennial Anniversary of the Emancipation
Proclamation.
- (October) John F. Kennedy sends troops to University of
Mississippi to enforce integration.

1963

- (Spring) Birmingham Marches led by King and Fred
Shuttlesworth.
- (May 24) Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall meet with the
Baldwin group in New York City.
- (June 11) Integration of the University of Alabama.
- (June 11) John F. Kennedy makes ―Moral Crisis‖ speech to the
American public, committing the federal government to the
creation of comprehensive civil rights legislation.
- (August 28) March on Washington.
- (September) Birmingham Church Bombing.
- (November) John F. Kennedy assassinated in Dallas, Texas.
- (November) Lyndon B. Johnson sworn in as president.

1964

- (July) Civil Rights Act of 1964.

1965

- (March) Selma: voting rights march to Montgomery.
- Voting Rights Act of 1965.
- (August) Riots in Watts, California.
- Malcolm X assassinated in New York City.
- (Summer) Riots in Chicago and Cleveland
- Stokely Carmichael becomes head of SNCC and creates
a separatist philosophy of black power, ousts whites from
the organization.
- Black Panther party founded.
- (Summer) Riots in Detroit, Michigan. U.S. military is
brought in to quell the violence, utilizing tanks and the
101st Airborne.

1968

- (April) Martin Luther King, Jr. assassinated in Memphis,
Tennessee.
- (June) Robert Kennedy assassinated in Los Angeles, California.
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APPENDIX D
EXCERPT FROM NEWSWEEK, JUNE 3 1963
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―Kennedy and Baldwin: The Gulf‖
There was so much James Baldwin wanted to tell Robert F. Kennedy. He wanted to talk
about the Negro kid in San Francisco who told him bitterly, ―I‘ve got no country, I‘ve got no
flag.‖ About the ―cat in the Harlem barber shop‖ who listens to Black Muslim Malcolm X rather
than the moderate Martin Luther King, Jr. because the extremist ―articulates the pain and despair
best.‖ About the jobless Negro in Detroit, the Negro children living in ―a kind of tinderbox‖ in
Chicago, the Negro anywhere who ―feels he is a burden, inferior, wont listen any longer, no
longer believes a word you say…‖
Perhaps there was just too much to tell. Baldwin, the sad-eyed Negro essayist, novelist,
and angry young man, got his chance to deliver the message at two remarkable meetings with the
Attorney General last week. But the confrontation was, by one participant‘s account, ―a gigantic
flop.‖
Kennedy himself had initiated the talks. As the Administration‘s No. 1 civil-rights
enforcer, he was worried about rising racial tensions, North and South. Hungry for new ideas, he
invited Baldwin down to his Hickory Hill estate at McLean, Va., for a preliminary breakfast.
―Look, Jim,‖ he said, ―get some of your best people together in New York and I‘ll come up and
we‘ll talk this whole thing over.‖
Pleased, Baldwin rounded up a mixed dozen, short on civil-rights organization men and
long on the lively arts (Harry Belafonte, Lena Horne, playwright Lorraine Hansberry, white actor
Rip Torn, and Baldwin‘s brother David, an actor). His aim: ―As wide and even as rowdy a range
of opinion as possible.‖ Kennedy and his civil-rights chief, Burke Marshall slipped into town,
and the group sat down in Joseph Kennedy‘s Central Park South apartment for two and a half
hours of informal talk.
But, as the Negroes saw it, they never bridged what Baldwin called the ―gulf‖ between
them—between Harlem and McLean. For one thing, the Negroes wanted to talk about race
troubles in the North, about the rising tensions over de facto segregation in the black ghettos. But
Kennedy, so they said, steered the talk south to Birmingham, Mississippi, ―the same old
stuff.‖…Voices and tempers flared…
That was precisely the message the Negroes wanted to get across—a message of anger,
of quickening urgency, of deepening alienation. Baldwin said, ―No one can afford to regard this
as a failure…We‘ve finally opened up a dialogue. No one can expect that dialogue to be polite,
but we‘ve started.‖ But plainly he had found the gulf too wide. ―He just didn‘t get the point,‖
Baldwin said. ―He was naïve, he doesn‘t know pain. He jus doesn‘t know.‖266
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